In theory, after shocks like this I should be six feet under. But, the way it turned out, I slowly got over this moral blow, thanks to my athletic past, my good physical health, et cetera. Is this all too much for me? No, categorically no. So what is it with me? I am not the type to take the easier or more pleasing course, to go by the satiny paved road rather than the rough footpath. I believe, and this is no empty phrase, that public activity or any other work counts for immeasurably more than personal considerations. . . . Look at people like the revolutionaries who died or the Decembrists [organizers of a revolt against Tsar Nicholas I in 1825] who were exiled to Siberia. What about us? Have we lost the moral capacity for selfsacrifice? [When I was Moscow first secretary] I worked from eight A.M. to midnight. . . . At a time of reconstruction, for three years or so everyone should work to the limit and make sacrifices. Then we will pull together and perestroika will have been given a push.47
Under terms of the political reforms agreed to in 1987–88, Soviet parliamentary bodies were to be reshaped. A new USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, with 2,250 members, was to be instituted. Two-thirds of its members were to be elected in territorial districts. One-third were to be chosen by the cartel of officially recognized and controlled associations. The CPSU filled its quota of 100 seats in a retrograde procedure: The Politburo nominated Gorbachev and ninety-nine others in a plenum of the party Central Committee on January 10, 1989, and a second plenum on March 16 approved all 100. As was barely noticed at the time, Boris Yeltsin in the January plenum cast the very
As the party’s bogeyman, Yeltsin had no chance at a protected spot. He could get into the congress only by standing in one of the 1,500 geographic districts. Gorbachev chewed over entering a district race but did not, out of fear that Yeltsin would run against him and beat him.49 Gorbachev’s selfdoubt did not make the electoral Rubicon one that Yeltsin could cross lightly. Government ministers, unlike party workers, were barred from the congress. To take up a seat if elected, Yeltsin would have to leave the Gosstroi position. The congress would name a new, compact standing parliament from among its members—the old name, Supreme Soviet, stayed—and only those on the Soviet would draw salaries as legislators. If Yeltsin got into the 2,250-member congress and was not one of the 542 chosen for the Supreme Soviet, he would be without a livelihood. It did not stop him. Sentient that the decision had “ripened long ago,” in mid-December 1988 he threw his hat in the ring.50
Scouting out nomination possibilities took Yeltsin two months. Papers were filed on his behalf in fifty localities, and on February 11 he was nominated as a native son in Berezniki, traveling there by a circuitous air route through Leningrad to throw CPSU monitors off. He related his embarrassment of riches to Anatolii Luk’yanov, the Central Committee secretary with whom he had shared a dacha in 1985. Yeltsin was duty-bound, Luk’yanov said, to leave the decision to the Politburo—to which Yeltsin snorted that this was “a conversation right out of the 1930s” that he would sooner forget. 51 His competitive juices raised, he took his chances by gunning for a seat in Moscow and not in the Urals. During the prescribed winnowingdown period, as the party organs tried to keep him off the ballot or shunt him to the boondocks, he pounded home his core message. “In Boris Yeltsin there is certainly more than an ounce of Huey Long,” David Remnick of
