Three days after gaining his seat, Yeltsin set out for a month-long vacation in Kislovodsk, in the North Caucasus. The decision removed him from the runoff stage, where some pro-reform nominees needed help. It struck some as eccentric. Aleksandr Muzykantskii also detected that Yeltsin wanted other players to make do without him for a time, and so to feel the need to approach him with offers of cooperation on his, the winner’s, terms.63 Back from Kislovodsk, Yeltsin orated at rallies in the Moscow suburb of Zelenograd and in front of the Luzhniki stadium.
From the first day of operations of the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, May 25, 1989, it was to be a little more than two years until the life-and-death crisis of the Soviet regime. Most of this caesura Yeltsin spent either in unproductive legislative activity or in campaigning for office. Time and initiative were on his side because he had the ace in the hole—people power—that other contestants did not have.
The congress’s organizing parley, televised live, showed the difficulty of translating charisma into institutional influence. High on the docket was selection of a chairman of the Supreme Soviet. It would be the cardinal office in the Soviet state, and Gorbachev meant to have it. In a conversation with Yeltsin in mid-May about their plans, Gorbachev offered him a ministerial post; Yeltsin refused and said, “Everything will be decided by the congress.” At a Politburo meeting days after that, Gorbachev instructed aides to offer Yeltsin the position of first deputy premier of the RSFSR and to craft an “intermediate response” to questions about Yeltsin’s dependability.64 The offer seems not to have been made. Yeltsin abstained on the motion at the May Central Committee plenum to nominate Gorbachev for the chairmanship—the only member to do so—and then declared he would vote for it in the congress because he was bound by party discipline. The Soviet Union, he said, was in a “revolutionary situation” which the party did not seem capable of facing.65 At the congress, he behaved coquettishly. He said in his maiden speech on May 26 that he was jobless as of the day before and might possibly agree to “some kind of nomination.” That night a Yeltsin representative consented to the urging of deputies from Sverdlovsk that his name be offered from the floor. Aleksandr Obolenskii, a little-known engineer from Leningrad, said he would do it—only to flipflop and nominate himself. Yeltsin distanced himself from the attempt, and 96 percent of the deputies voted on May 27 to elect Gorbachev.66
After this comedy of errors came a more pressing problem: Yeltsin having given up his Gosstroi post, unfriendly deputies blocked him from so much as a seat in the Supreme Soviet. Of the twelve deputies nominated for the RSFSR’s eleven seats in the Council of Nationalities (the section of the Supreme Soviet for which Yeltsin was eligible), he finished dead last in the congressional voting, his 5 million popular votes notwithstanding. The day was saved by Gavriil Popov, the Moscow economic thinker whom Yeltsin had cold-shouldered in 1987. He sold Gorbachev on a resolution. Aleksei Kazannik, a jurist from Omsk, Siberia, freed up a seat for him, and the congress on May 29 approved. Gorbachev wanted a vote on whether Yeltsin would fill the vacancy. Kazannik would not budge on the package deal and received more than 100,000 congratulatory telegrams.67 In his first speech to the congress on May 31, Yeltsin called for a yearly country-wide referendum on confidence in the chairman of parliament and for conversion of the Kremlin medical directorate into a service for mothers and children.
