Events at Blue Book and ATIC were reaching a climax. By December, Blue Book was down to thirty UFO reports per month, but unknowns were still running at 20 percent. Nevertheless, Ruppelt at this time asked for a transfer out of Blue Book, agreeing to stay until the end of February. His book gave no reason for this request, and mentioned it only in passing. At the very least, his request seems odd. Although not yet thirty, Ruppelt had managed an air force project that had risen to prominence within a year, and which enabled him to travel around the country and give high-level briefings to senior Pentagon officials on a subject that fascinated millions of people. By all indications, he was respected for his work. Why, then, would he request a transfer out? And why withhold the reason? There are no certain answers, but perhaps Ruppelt had gotten some indication of the nature of the upcoming CIA-sponsored Robertson Panel. Or maybe he began to realize that the Blue Book operation was not what the air force said it was—the military’s primary UFO investigative unit. Whatever the reason, it appears that Ruppelt had an idea of what was shortly to come to ATIC.69
THE CIA GETS READY
On November 21, 1952, an air force review panel met at ATIC for three days and recommended that a “higher court” be formed to review the case of the UFO. They tentatively scheduled this to take place in late December or early January.70 On December 2, 1952, H. Marshall Chadwell prepared another secret memo for CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith. The controversial memo stated:
At this time, the reports of incidents convince us that there is something going on that must have immediate attention.... Sightings of unexplained objects at great altitudes and traveling at high speeds in the vicinity of major U.S. defense installations are of such nature that they are not attributable to natural phenomena or known types of aerial vehicles.71
The fact that Chadwell could write such a statement shows that there were high-level people within the CIA who thought the UFO problem was relevant for more than its effect on the cold war. Chadwell clearly was concerned about the UFOs themselves, although he studiously avoided arriving at a conclusion on the matter. A National Security Council memo was attached to this, stating that the UFO problem had “implications for our national security.” It directed the CIA to “formulate, and carry out a program ... to solve the problem of instant, positive identification of unidentified flying objects.”72
Two days after Chadwell’s memo, the Intelligence Advisory Committee gave the go-ahead for the panel. It recommended that the director of Central Intelligence “enlist the services of selected scientists to review and appraise the available evidence in the light of pertinent scientific theories.” Chadwell was the driving force and wanted H. P. Robertson to lead the panel. Robertson accepted it “against his will,” then brought in the other four members.73
A week later, on December 12, another meeting was held at ATIC, attended by representatives from CIA, ATIC, and the Battelle Memorial Institute from Columbus, Ohio. For some time, a group at Battelle had been studying the UFO problem, in Hynek’s words, in “very great secrecy.” When members of this group learned of the impending CIA-sponsored study, they sent an urgent letter, classified Secret, to the CIA via the Blue Book office. They wanted the upcoming scientific panel postponed until they finished their own study. In January 1953, H. C. Cross, a senior staff member at Battelle, wrote a letter to Miles Coll at Wright-Patterson AFB, with attention to Captain Ruppelt. Cross, realizing it was futile to delay the impending panel until Battelle could complete its study, argued that “agreement between Project Stork (Battelle) and ATIC should be reached as to what can and what cannot be discussed” at the meeting. He also suggested a “controlled experiment” be undertaken by the air force in order to obtain better physical data. This would consist of “observation posts with complete visual skywatch, with radar and photographic coverage, plus all other instruments necessary or helpful in obtaining positive and reliable data on everything in the air over the area.” Cross actually suggested that the Air Force release “many different types of aerial activity ... secretly and purposefully,” presumably in order to generate spurious UFO reports. There is no evidence that any such program occurred. However, while Battelle failed to delay the timing of the Robertson Panel, it did eventually release its own report, named Blue Book Special Report Number 14, which developed an interesting history of its own.74
THE ROBERTSON PANEL
