The Wednesday meeting reviewed the CIA interest in the matter, including the OSI study from August (authored by Strong, Eng, and Durant), the ATIC November 21 meeting, the December 4 IAC decision, the visit to ATIC by Chadwell, Durant, and Robertson, and CIA concern over “potential dangers to national security indirectly related to these sightings.” The group also saw the Tremonton and Montana films that morning.
In the afternoon, Ruppelt, Hynek, and Fournet were present, as were Capt. Harry Smith and Dr. Stephen Possony. Navy analysts Harry Woo and Robert Neasham of the USN Photo Interpretation Laboratory in Anacosta presented their analysis of both films, which “evoked considerable discussion.” This segment lasted two hours. Ruppelt then spoke for forty minutes on Blue Book’s methods of handling UFO reports. The meeting adjourned at 5:15 P.M.
The group met again on Thursday. In addition to panel members and CIA personnel, Ruppelt and Hynek attended. Ruppelt spoke some more about Blue Book; Hynek described the work in progress at Battelle. The CIA also showed a motion picture film of seagulls, a clear hint at the conclusions they were seeking to reach. (Why would the CIA obtain motion pictures of seagulls flying, anyway?) Lieutenant Colonel Oder gave a forty-minute presentation on Project Twinkle. That afternoon, General Garland attended and stated his desire to: (1) increase the use of thoroughly briefed air force intelligence officers to investigate UFO reports, (2) “declassify as many of the reports as possible,” and (3) enlarge Blue Book.
Excepting Garland, everyone met again on Friday morning. Hynek and Fournet each spoke at some length. Fournet gave no indication of his press release plan, but was confident in his material and assumed the panel would accept his evidence and agree on the need to prepare the country.75 His description of individual cases evoked “considerable discussion.” After Berkner finally arrived that afternoon, Robertson reviewed the panel’s work and offered “tentative” conclusions. Moreover, “it was agreed” that Robertson would draft the panel report (which had primarily been done in advance by Durant). On Saturday morning, the final day the group met, Robertson presented a “rough draft” of the panel report. Strangely, Berkner had previously reviewed and approved this draft. So did Robertson and Berkner burn the midnight oil on Friday night? Unlikely. Especially since by 11 A.M. CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith was shown the draft, as was Air Force Director of Intelligence General Samford, both of whom were favorable to it. Fast work, indeed. The day was spent primarily in reworking the draft (presumably, some of the report had to reflect the week’s work).
ROBERTSON PANEL: CONCLUSIONS
The panel report noted “the lack of sound data in the great majority of cases, and concluded that most sightings could be reasonably explained if more data were available.” Trying to solve every sighting, however, “would be a great waste of effort.” The panel concluded that UFOs presented no evidence of a direct threat to national security, despite Chadwell’s memo from the previous month which stated otherwise. Toward this end the report indicated that both Robertson and Alvarez had been involved in investigating foo fighters during the Second World War [!] and had found them unexplained but harmless.
While the panel members seemed uninterested in UFOs themselves, they were quite concerned about the public dimension of the UFO problem. It is questionable why a group of scientists would express an opinion on a matter of national security, something wholly outside its collective expertise. At least, it would be if these men were functioning as scientists. They decided it was “possibly dangerous in having the military service foster public concern in ‘nocturnal meandering lights.’” Therefore, it recommended an “educational or training program” targeted to the public to eliminate “the popular feeling that every sighting, no matter how poor the data, must be explained in detail.” The educational program aimed toward “training and debunking”:
The debunking aim would result in reduction in public interest in “flying saucers” which today evokes a strong psychological reaction. This education could be accomplished by mass media such as television, motion pictures, and popular articles.
And the problem of gaining influence over the mass media? A foregone conclusion. The panel members were not short on their knowledge of people and channels within the media. Despite Hynek’s claim in later years that he was “negatively impressed” by the attitude taken by the panel leaders, he “suggested that the amateur astronomers in the U.S. might be a potential source of enthusiastic talent ‘to spread the gospel,’” that is, of debunking UFOs.
