To frighten the British people, the British government circulated stories about
the strength of the German Army and Air Force which were greatly exaggerated;
they implied that Germany would use poison gas at once and from the air, although
this was quite untrue; they distributed gas masks and madly built trenches in
London parks, although the former were needless and the latter worthless. On 23
September, the British advised the Czechoslovakian government to mobilize, although
they had previously forbidden it. This was done to increase the crisis in London, and the
fact that Göring's air force allowed it to go through without attack indicates his belief that
Germany did not need to fight. In fact, Goring told the French Ambassador on 12
September that he had positive assurance that Britain would not fight. As early as 1
September 1938, Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's alter ego, told the German
charge d'affaires in London. Theodor Kordt, “If we two, Great Britain and
Germany, come to agreement regarding the settlement of the Czech problem, we
shall simply brush aside the resistance that France or Czechoslovakia herself may
offer to the decision.”
The fraudulent nature of the Munich crisis appears throughout its history. We might
mention the following: (1) the suspicious fashion in which the Runciman Mission was
sent to Czechoslovakia, immediately after Hitler's aide, Captain Wiedemann, visited
Halifax at the latter's home (not the Foreign Office) on 18 July 1938, and with the
statement, which was untrue, that it was being sent at the desire of the Czechoslovaks;
(13) (2) the fact that Runciman in Czechoslovakia spent most of his time with the
Sudetens and put pressure on the government to make one concession after another to
Henlein, when it was perfectly clear that Henlein did not want a settlement; (3) the fact
that Runciman wrote to Hitler on 2 September that he would have a plan for a settlement
by 15 September; (4) the fact that this Runciman plan was practically the same as the
Munich settlement finally adopted; (5) the fact that Chamberlain made the war-scare over
the Godesberg proposals and, after making a settlement at Munich, made no effort to
enforce those provisions by which Munich differed from Godesberg, but on the contrary
allowed the Germans to take what they wished in Czechoslovakia as they wished; (6) the
fact that the government did all it could to exclude Russia from the settlement, although
Russia was allied to both Czechoslovakia and France; (7) the fact that the government
and the French government tried to spread the belief that Russia would not honor these
commitments, although all the evidence indicated that she would; (8) the fact that
Chamberlain had a tête-à-tête conference with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 15 September,
which lasted for three hours, and at which only Hitler's private interpreter was present as
a third party, and that this was repeated at Godesberg on 23 September; (9) the fact that
the Czechoslovaks were forced to yield to Chamberlain's settlement under pressure of
ultimatums from both France and Britain, a fact that was concealed from the British
people by omitting a crucial document from the White Paper of 28 September 1938
(Cmd. 5847).
Two additional points, concerned with the degree of German armaments and the
position of the anti-Hitler resistance within Germany, require further elucidation. For
years before June 1938, the government had insisted that British rearming was
progressing in a satisfactory fashion. Churchill and others had questioned this and had
produced figures on German rearmament to prove that Britain's own progress in this field
was inadequate. These figures were denied by the government, and their own
accomplishments were defended. In 1937 and in 1938, Churchill had clashed with
Baldwin and Chamberlain on this issue. As late as March 1938, Chamberlain said that
British armaments were such as to make her an "almost terrifying power . . . on the
opinion of the world." But as the year went on, the government adopted a quite different
attitude. In order to persuade public opinion that it was necessary to yield to Germany,