the Government pretended that its armaments were quite inadequate in comparison with
Germany." We now know, thanks to the captured papers of the German Ministry of War,
that this was a gross exaggeration. These papers were studied by Major General C. F.
Robinson of the United States Army, and analyzed in a report which he submitted to the
Secretary of War in October 1947. This document, entitled
rearmament in the period 1933-1939 were gross exaggerations. From 1936 to the
outbreak of war, German aircraft production was not raised, but averaged 425 planes a
month. Her tank production was low and even in 1939 was less than Britain's. In the first
9 months of 1939, Germany produced only 50 tanks a month; in the last 4 months of
1939, in wartime, Germany produced 247 "tanks and self-propelled guns," compared to a
British production of 314 tanks in the same period. At the time of the Munich crisis,
Germany had 35 infantry and 4 motorized divisions, none of them fully manned or
equipped. This was no more than Czechoslovakia had alone. Moreover, the Czech Army
was better trained, had far better equipment, and had better morale and better
fortifications. As an example of this point, we might mention that the Czech tank was of
38 tons, while the Germans, before 1938, had no tank over 10 tons. During 1938 they
brought into production the Mark III tank of less than 20 tons, and in 1939 brought into
production the Mark IV of 23 tons. Up to September 1939, the German Army had
obtained only 300 tanks of the Mark III and Mark IV types together. Most of these were
delivered during 1939. In comparison, the Germans captured in Czechoslovakia, in
March 1939, 469 of the superior Czech tanks. At the same time they captured 1500
planes (of which 500 were first-line), 43,000 machine-guns, and over 1 million rifles.
These figures are comparable with what Germany had at Munich, and at that time, if the
British government had desired, Germany would have been facing France, Britain, and
Russia, as well as Czechoslovakia.
It should perhaps be mentioned that up to September 1939 the German Navy had
acquired only 53 submarines during the Hitler regime. No economic mobilization for war
had been made and no reserve stocks built up. When the war began, in September 1939,
Germany had ammunition for 6 weeks, and the air force had bombs for 3 months at the
rate of expenditure experienced during the Polish campaign. At that time the Air Force
consisted of 1000 bombers and 1050 fighters. In contrast, the British air program of May
1938 planned to provide Britain with a first-line force of 2370 planes; this program was
stepped up in 1939. Under it, Britain produced almost 3000 military planes in 1938 and
about 8000 in 1939. The German figures for planes produced in these 2 years are 5235
and 8295, but these are figures for all planes produced in the country, including civil as
well as military airplanes. As Hanson Baldwin put it, "Up until 1940, at least, Germany's
production did not markedly outstrip Britain's." It might also be mentioned that British
combat planes were of better quality.
We have no way of knowing if the Chamberlain government knew these facts. It
should have known them. At the least, it should not have deluged its own people with
untrue stories about German arms. Surprisingly, the British have generally refused to
modify these stories, and, in order to perpetuate the fable about the necessity for the
Munich surrender, they have continued to repeat the untrue propaganda stories of 1937-
1939 regarding German armaments. This is as true of the critics of Munich as of its
defenders. Both have adopted the version that Britain yielded to superior and
overwhelming force at Munich. They have done this even though this story is untrue and
they are in a position to know that it is untrue. For example, Winston Churchill, in his
war memoirs, repeats the old stories about German rearmament, although he has been
writing two years or more after the Reichswehr archives were captured. For this he was
criticized by Hanson Baldwin in
papers of the German Foreign Ministry, accepts the old propaganda tales of German
rearmament as axiomatic, and accordingly does not even discuss the subject. He merely
tells his readers: "By the close of 1937 Germany's preparedness for war was complete.
The preference for guns rather than for butter had brought forth results. Her rearmament
had reached its apogee and could hold that peak level for a certain time. Her economy
was geared to a strict regime of rationing and output on a war level." None of this was
true, and Mr. Wheeler-Bennett should have examined the evidence. If he had, he would