76. DGFP, D, VI, 1047–8 (here 1048), N0.757.
77. DGFP, D, VI, 1059–62 (here 1060), 1067–8, Nos.766, 772.
78. DGFP, D, VI, 1006–9, 1015–16, 1047–8, Nos.729, 736, 757; Weizsäcker-Papiere, 157 (entry for 30 July 1939); Weinberg II, 605.
79. DGFP, D, VI, 1059–62, No.766. Molotov had been ‘unusually open’ (1059) and twice mentioned ‘well-known demands on Poland’ (1060–61).
80. Weinberg II, 604.
81. CP, 300, 304; DGFP, D, VII, 39–49 (quotation, 47), N0.43.
82. Domarus, 1217.
83. Keitel, 206; Domarus, 1214; Irving, Führer, 190.
84. Below, 166–9.
85. Below, 172–4.
86. Domarus, 1217–19.
87. Schneider, Nr.44, 31 October 1952.
88. Kubizek, 282–6.
89. CD, 91 (21 May 1939). Ciano had found Hitler well, but looking older, with more wrinkled eyes. He remarked on Hitler’s insomnia.
90. Schneider, Nr.43, 24 October 1952, 1,8. See also Sereny, Speer, 193–5.
91. Seraphim, Rosenberg-Tagebuch, 81 (6 February 1939). Rosenberg’s opinion that Goebbels was so disliked was based, to go from the context of his remarks, on the Propaganda Minister’s use of his power for the sexual exploitation of young women hoping for career-advancement. In conversation with Himmler, Rosenberg also went on to criticize Goebbels for the damage to the state caused by the ‘Reichskristallnacht’ pogrom.
92. See Martens, 178ff., 199; Kube, 312; Irving, Göring, 247–54.
93. Sereny, 206.
94. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 234.
95. Weinberg II, 583–4 and n.199.
96. Steinert, 84ff.; Ian Kershaw, ‘Der Überfall auf Polen und die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland’, in Ernst Willi Hansen, Gerhard Schreiber, and Bernd Wegner (eds.), Politischer Wandel, organisierte Gewalt und nationale Sicherheit. Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte Deutschlands und Frankreichs. Festschrift für Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Munich, 1995, 237–50, here 239–45.
97. DBS, vi.407ff.
98. McKee, 27.
99. StA Bamberg, K8/III, 18473, BA Ebermannstadt, no date (end of July 1939).
100. DBS, vi.275.
101. DBS, vi.561.
102. DBS, vi.818.
103. DBS, vi.409ff.
104. Herbert S. Levine, Hitler’s Free City. A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925–39, Chicago/London, 1973, 151; and Weinberg II, 584 n.208.
105. Carl J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission 1937–1939, Munich, 1962, 254–5 for the customs crisis.
106. Burckhardt, 255–6.
107. See Herbert S. Levine, ‘The Mediator: Carl J. Burckhardt’s Efforts to Avert a Second World War’, JMH, 45 (1973), 439–55. here 453–5.
108. Burckhardt, 261–3; and see Paul Stauffer, Zwischen Hofmannsthal und Hitler. Carl J. Burckhardt: Facetten einer aussergewöhnlichen Existenz, Zurich, 1991, 141ff., who points out (152–3) that news of the ‘secret’ meeting was deliberately leaked in advance, almost certainly on Hitler’s initiative, in an attempt to demonstrate his openness to dialogue with the west, to the French journalist (known to have sympathized in the past with Nazi Germany) Bertrand de Jouvenel.
109. Burckhardt, 264. The ‘Eagle’s Nest’, built at a height of almost 2,000 metres, some 800 metres higher up than the Berghof itself, was actually no ‘Tea House’. Hitler’s ‘Tea House’, the regular goal of his afternoon walks, lay below the Berghof. The name ‘Teehaus’ was a corruption of the official name D-Haus (Diplomaten-Haus), which betrayed the intention of making the maximum impression upon selected important foreign visitors. It had been designed by Bormann, with plans reaching back to 1936, as a present for Hitler’s fiftieth birthday. Around 3,500 men worked on it and, by the time that it was finished in summer 1938, it had cost some 30 million Reich Marks. During most of the war years it was empty and unused. (Ernst Hanisch, Der Obersalzberg: das Kehlsteinhaus und Adolf Hitler, Berchtesgaden, 1995, 18–21; Below, 124. See the impressions of François-Poncet, Als Botschafter, 395–7.)
110. Below, 124.
111. Schneider, Nr.46, 14 November 1952, 8; Speer, 176.
112. At his first visit to the ‘Eagle’s Nest’ the previous summer, Hitler had mentioned that he would take up there visitors he wanted especially to honour or impress (Below, 124).
113. Schneider, Nr.46, 14 November 1952, 8.
