Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis полностью

121. CP, 299–303. Just over a week later, on 20 August, the former head of the London branch of the German News Agency, Fritz Hesse, was conveying to the British Government, on the authorization of Ribbentrop, the impression not simply of Hitler’s determination to resolve the Danzig issue, come what may, but — probably to be seen as bluff — of his awareness ‘that if war should break out between Germany and Poland Great Britain will be in it’. (Josef Henke, ‘Hitler und England Mitte August 1939. Ein Dokument zur Rolle Fritz Hesse in den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges’, VfZ, 21 (1973), 231–42, especially 240 and (for the quotation) 241. Henke (and Hesse himself, as he later stated) regarded the remarks as a genuine reflection of Hitler’s views at the time, not as a tactical calculation — see 236 and n.20.) The claims made by Hesse in his book, Fritz Hesse, Das Spiel um Deutschland, Munich, 1953, about the importance of his role as an intermediary between the German and British governments in the last weeks of peace are greatly exaggerated.

122. CD, 124.

123. DGFP, D, VII, 39–49 (48–9 for the interruption in the talks), 58–9, Nos. 43, 50; CP, 302.

124. DGFP, D, VII, 68–9, No.62; Bloch, 240; Read and Fisher, The Deadly Embrace, 193–4.

125. Bloch, 240. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 109–10, suggest that the Foreign Minister had himself proposed Göring. Since the two were arch-rivals, this sounds inherently unlikely. Ribbentrop’s comment that he knew nothing at this time of Hitler’s intention to attack Poland is not credible.

126. Bloch, 241–4.

127. DGFP, D, VII, 142–8, 152–3, Nos.131, 135. It was agreed on 19 August and signed, after some further delay from the Moscow end, at 2 a.m. on 20 August.

128. DGFP, D, VII, 134, No.125; Read and Fisher, The Deadly Embrace, 214.

129. That Hitler was planning to attack Poland by the end of August or beginning of September had been known to Stalin since June (Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin. Triumph and Tragedy, (1991), Rocklin Ca., 1996, 357). The frenetic diplomatic activity in Berlin in mid-August was an indicator to Stalin and Molotov that the date of the invasion was close (Weinberg II, 608). Bloch, 244, states (without source) that Stalin and Molotov knew that Hitler was intending to invade on 26 August.

130. DGFP, D, VII, 156–7, N0.142.

131. Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, 102. Speer’s account, 176, differs in detail, recording Hitler’s reactions on receiving the telegram (for which see Domarus, 1233).

132. Steinert, 85–6. And see Schmidt, 449; Shirer, 145.

133. Baumgart, 142 (the comment written in November 1939 of General Liebmann), and 145 n.100, citing Rundstedt’s recollections in testimony at Nuremberg on 19 June 1946; see also Below, 181.

134. TBJG, I/7, 72 (22 August 1939).

135. TBJG, I/7, 72 (24 August 1939): ‘Wir sind in Not und fressen da wie der Teufel Fliegen.’

136. Seraphim, Rosenberg-Tagebuch, 89–90 (22 August 1939).

137. See DBS, vi.985–6.

138. DBS, vi.988.

139. Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, 103.

140. TBJG, I/7, 73 (23 August 1939).

141. Watt, How War Came, 466.

142. Cit. Werner Maser, Der Wortbruch. Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg, (1994), 4th edn, Munich, 1997, 59–60.

143. Watt, How War Came, 467–70.

144. Meehan, 233–4. Halifax stressed only the importance of the effect on morale.

145. Watt, How War Came, 463.

146. The order to attend the meeting was delivered to General Liebmann on the morning of 21 August (Baumgart, 141).

147. Below, 181.

148. Baumgart, 144 n.97, 148.

149. Baumgart, 144 n.97. Some present later claimed that they were there in uniform. The most contemporary accounts, however, mention civilian clothes. Below, 180, confirms this.

150. Baumgart, 142.

151. Baumgart, 143 and n.93–6, 148.

152. Baumgart, 143 and n.96.

153. Baumgart, 148 n.111. The notes were handwritten headings, according to Below, 181.

154. Baumgart, 120.

155. Baumgart, 122–8. For the significance of the document, its authenticity, and the authorship of the best version (that of Canaris), see Baumgart’s article, and his reply, ‘Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939 (Erwiderung)’, VfZ, 19 (1971), 301–4, to Hermann Böhm, ‘Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939’, VfZ, 19 (1971), 294–300.

156. IMG, xxvi, 338–44, Doc. 798-PS; DGFP, D, VII, 200–204 (quotations 204), No.192; Baumgart, 149 and n.113 for the timing and lunchtime break, 135–6, n.67. Also Below, 181.

157. For the time, Baumgart, 126, 149 n.113. Below recalled that he spoke for about two hours. (Below, 180). Baumgart, 132–3 n.53, 55 for operational talks, and reference to Halder and Warli-mont; Below, 181.