158. On the different interpretations of what Hitler meant by this phrase, see Baumgart, 133 and n.57.
159. IMG, xxvi, 523–4, D0C.1014-PS; DGFP, D, VII, 205–6, No.205–6 (quotations, 205).
160. Baumgart, 146.
161. Baumgart, 146.
162. Below, 181, thought the Soviet pact had silenced some sceptics.
163. Baumgart, 148. For Hitler’s insistence that the West would not intervene, see IfZ, F34/1, Vormann Memoirs, Fols.42–3.
164. Hassell, 71.
165. Below, 181–2.
166. Baumgart, 143 n.96, 146; Schmidt, 449–50; Bloch, 246.
167. Schmidt, 455. Hoffmann’s account of the visit to Moscow (Hitler Was My Friend, 103–14) is inaccurate and self-important. The signs are that Stalin was, in fact, less than happy at Hoffmann’s photographic interference and did not welcome the publicity (Ribbentrop Memoirs, 114).
168. Based on Ribbentrop Memoirs, 110–13, and Schmidt, 450–52. Both are variedly inaccurate on the time of arrival and first talks; see Bloch, 247. Though Schulenburg had been in Moscow for years, it was the first time that he had spoken to Stalin.
169. Below, 182.
170. Below, 183. Speer, 177, gives a distorted version of the incident, which is also graphically described by the ‘manager’ (Verwalter) at the Berghof, Herrmann Döring, BBC-Archive, ‘The Nazis: A Warning from History’, Transcript, Roll 244, Fols.30–37. Speer recalled after the war that no one hearing Hitler was shocked by his remarks about the shedding of much blood, and that Germany would have to plunge into the abyss with him if the war was not won. Speer himself was taken, so he recalled, by ‘the grandeur of the historical hour’ (Albert Speer, Spandau. The Secret Diaries, Fontana edn, London, 1977, 40–41 (entry for 21 December 1946)).
171. Schmidt, 452–3; Below, 183; Ribbentrop Memoirs, 113. A telegram containing just those words followed within two hours (DGFP, D, VII, 220, 223, Nos. 205, 210).
172. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 113; Schmidt, 454. Hoffmann’s account, Hitler Was My Friend, 109–11, cannot be trusted.
173. Bloch, 249 (contradicting Ribbentrop’s own claim, Ribbentrop Memoirs, 113, that they were signed before midnight).
174. TBJG, I/7, 75 (24 August 1939).
175. Below, 183.
176. Watt, How War Came, 463, 465. Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State in the USA, was told on 22 August by Joseph E. Davies, former US Ambassador in Moscow, that news of the non-aggression pact was ‘not unexpected’ (Davies, 453–4).
177. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 200.
178. Nicolson, 154.
179. Chips, 208–9.
180. N. J. Crowsen (ed.), Fleet Street, Press Barons, and Politics: the Journals of Collin Brooks, 1932–1940, Camden Soc, 5th Ser., vol.11, London, 1998, 252.
181. Roberts, 174; Allan Merson, Communist Resistance in Nazi Germany, London, 1985, 212–13.
182. Heinz Kühnrich, ‘Der deutsch-sowjetische Nichtangriffsvertrag vom 23. August 1939 aus der zeitgenössischen Sicht der KPD’, in Eichholtz and Pätzold, 517–51, here 519 (quotation), 529.
183. Below, 184.
184. See TBJG, I/7, 74–7 (24 August 1939, 25 August 1939) for the uncertainty of Goebbels who, at this time on the Berghof, was probably echoing Hitler’s own sentiments.
185. Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939, London, 1939, 96–8, No.56; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 170–71 (here 171), No.207; DGFP, D, VII, 215–16, No.200; Henderson, 256.
186. Documents, 99, No.57; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 161–3 (here 162), No.200; see Henderson, 247–8, 256–7, 301–5.
187. Documents, 99–100, N0.57; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 161–3 (here 163), N0.200; DGFP, D, VII, 210–16, No.200; Domarus, 1244–7.
188. DBFP, 3rd Ser.VII, 201–2 (quotation 201), N0.248.
189. Documents, 100–101, N0.58; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 201–2 (here 202), N0.248; DGFP, D, VII, 210–16, No.200; Henderson, 257; Domarus, 1249–50.
190. Domarus, 1247–8; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 177–9 (here, 178), No.211.
191. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 252.
