269. Halder KTB, ii.133 (11 October 1940); Weizsäcker-Papiere, 221 (21 October 1940).
270. Preston, Franco, 393.
271. Schmidt, 510–11, claimed that Franco’s train was an hour late. In fact, it was eight minutes late (Preston, Franco, 394).
272. Schmidt, 511.
273. The following account is based upon Staatsmänner I, 133–40 (quotation, 138); and Schmidt, 511–14. Schmidt, 511, conveys the misleading impression that he was present throughout the talks. In fact, another German interpreter was used on this occasion since Schmidt did not command fluent Spanish. Schmidt was in the party at Hendaye, however, and almost certainly drew up the (incomplete) record of the discussion for the Foreign Office. He was, therefore, thoroughly versed in the course of the talks, and his account accords well with the contemporary notes of the Spanish interpreter, Baron de las Torres. On the meeting, see, especially, Paul Preston, ‘Franco and Hitler: the Myth of Hendaye 1940’, Contemporary European History, 1 (1992), 1–16, here 9–10; and Preston, Franco, 394–400. The misleading impression given by Schmidt is pointed out in David Wingeate Pike, ‘Franco and the Axis Stigma’, JCH, 17 (1982), 369–406, here 377–9.
274. See Samuel Hoare, Ambassador on Special Mission, London, 1946, 92–5, for the general view in diplomatic circles that Spanish claims on north Africa had been the major stumbling-block in the discussions.
275. Cit. Preston, ‘Hendaye’, 10 and n.32 (the reported comment of the Spanish interpreter, Baron de las Torres, on 26 October 1940).
276. Cit. Preston, ‘Hendaye’, 12.
277. Schmidt, 514; Bloch, 311–12.
278. CP, 401–2.
279. Halder KTB, ii.158 (1 November 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 272. Halder was noting comments passed on by Hitler’s Army adjutant, Gerhard Engel.
280. Schmidt, 514–16.
281. François Delpla, Montoire. Les premiers jours de la collaboration, Paris, 1996, ch.16, and Delpla, Hitler, 337–8, places a more positive gloss on the outcome of the talks, from Hitler’s point of view, especially in terms of the propaganda impression intended to be conveyed abroad that Germany was indomitable on the continent of Europe.
282. Staatsmänner, i.49; Halder KTB, ii.157–8 (1 November 1940); CP, 401; and see Jäckel, Frankreich, 121.
283. Schmidt, 516; Below, 249. Hitler’s disappointment was implicit in the comments passed on by Engel and noted by Halder. (Halder KTB, ii.158 (1 November 1940).)
284. Below, 250.
285. Schmidt, 516–17; Engel, 88 (28 October 1940).
286. CP, 399–404; Schmidt, 517.
287. CP, 402.
288. Engel, 89–90 (4 November 1940), and n.272.
289. Carr, Poland, 98–9, 118–19; Martin van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy 1940–1941. The Balkan Clue, Cambridge, 1973, 69–72; and see Robert Cecil, Hitler’s Decision to Invade Russia 1941, London, 1975, Ch.VI-VII.
290. Weisungen, 81, Directive No.18, Section 5 (12 November 1940).
291. Carr, Poland, 120.
292. Weizsdcker-Papiere, 224 (15 November 1940). The Molotov visit is well described in Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, ch.46, 510ff. The following account draws on Schmidt, 526–36, and the official texts of the discussions: Staatsmänner I, 166–93; ADAP, D, XI.1, 455–61, 462–72, Nos.326, 328.
293. Carr, Poland, 121.
294. Staatsmänner I, 193; ADAP, D, XI.1, 472–8, No.329.
295. ADAP, D, XI.2, 597–8, No.404; Carr, Poland, 121; Weinberg III, 201; Bloch, 316.
296. Bloch, 316.
297. Hillgruber, Strategie, 356 and n.21 (Engel communication of 10 April 1964).
298. Engel, 91 (15 November 1940).
299. Below, 253.
300. Fedor von Bock, The War Diary 1939–1945, ed. Klaus Gerbet, Atglen PA, 1996, 193–4 (3 December 1940); Hillgruber, Strategie, 361 n.50. The translation of part of the passage from Bock’s diary — ‘zumal ein wirksames Eingreifen Amerikas dann durch Japan, das nun den Rücken frei hat, erschwert wird’ (‘especially since an effective intervention by America would be complicated by Japan, which would keep our rear free’) — mistakenly implies that the implication of eliminating the Soviet Union would be that Germany’s, not Japan’s, rear would be unexposed.
