312. Below, 324. Both those close to Hitler and those who later castigated his direction of the war concurred many years after the events that he accepted Göring’s assurances that the troops at Stalingrad could be sustained from the air. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Tapes, T1-S1, interview of Adolf Heusinger by John Toland, 30 March 1970; 68–1, interview of Otto Günsche by John Toland, 26 March 1971.) For the dreadful weather conditions in Stalingrad in November, at times dipping to as low as minus eighteen degrees Celsius, see Antony Beevor, Stalingrad, London, 1998, 214, 230, 232.
313. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 219; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 86; DRZW, vi. 1025–6; Gruchmann, Zweiter Weltkrieg, 192.
314. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 220; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 87; DRZW, vi.1028–9.
315. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 192.
316. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 224; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 87–8; Manstein, 315; DRZW, vi.1032. Manstein’s own post-war account of Stalingrad (Manstein, 289–366) showed, naturally enough, his own actions in the best possible light. Hitler (almost exclusively), though to some extent Göring (for his unrealistic claims to relieve Stalingrad by air), and Paulus (for errors in not attempting to break out while there was still time) were held responsible for the débâcle. While Hitler’s disastrous leadership and overriding culpability are undeniable, it was accepted by a strong critic of Hitler’s direction of the war, former Army Operations Chief Adolf Heusinger, long after the war, that Manstein had to share some of the blame for the catastrophe. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Tapes, T1-S1, interview of Adolf Heusinger by John Toland, 30 March 1970.) See also the critical assessments by Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel (eds.), Stalingrad. Memories and Reassessments, (1962), London, 1997, 148–78; Beevor, 308–10; and, especially, DRZW, vi.1060–3. Less critical of Manstein is Geoffrey Jukes, Hitler’s Stalingrad Decisions, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1985, 106–47, where, however, Hitler’s disastrous role is portrayed within an increasingly overloaded process of decision-making, not just on the Stalingrad front.
317. Manstein, 316; DRZW, vi.1033.
318. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 386ff.; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 97–8; DRZW, vi.1033–4.
319. Below, 324; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 192–3. For Hoth’s attempt, DRZW, vi.1035ff.
320. According to KTB OKW, ii/2, 1168 (21 December 1942), Manstein had stated at the briefing that the 6th Army could advance a maximum of 30 kilometres; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 99; Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 334; DRZW, vi.1048.
321. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 406–7; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 99–100.
322. KTB OKW, ii/2, 1168 (21 December 1942).
323. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 407; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 100; DRZW, vi.1048.
324. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 410; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 100; DRZW, vi. 1048–9.
325. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 93.
326. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 431–2; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 101.
327. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 93.
328. Below, 324.
329. Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 102; Manstein, 373.
330. Weinberg III, 441; Below, 329.
331. Irving, Göring, 372–3.
332. Weinberg III, 434, 436.
333. Irving, Göring, 373.
334. See The Rommel Papers, ed. B.H. Liddell Hart, London, 1953, 368–9.
335. Staatsmänner II, 160–81 (18 December 1942), 190–6 (19 December 1942, 20 December 1942), here especially 165, 168–70, 195 (‘kriegsentscheidend’).
336. CD, 536 (18 December 1942).
337. CD, 535 (18 December 1942); Staatsmänner II, 169–70 (18 December 1942).
338. Staatsmänner II, 192 (19 December 1942).
339. William Craig, Enemy at the Gates. The Battle for Stalingrad, London, 1973, 295–6; Beevor, 313.
340. Craig, 293.
341. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 191; Buchbender/Sterz, 99. For graphic accounts of the terrible conditions of the doomed army in its last weeks, see Beevor, especially ch. 19–22; and Craig, 259–381.
