383. Hassell, 348–9 (14 February 1943); Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 464ff.; Ritter, 35off.; Hoffmann, 346ff., Joachim Fest, Staatsstreich. Der lange Weg zum 20. Juli, Berlin, 1994, 199–205.
384. Inge Scholl, Die Weiβe Rose, Frankfurt am Main, 1952, 108; (‘Kommilitonen! Kommilitoninnen! Erschüttert steht unser Volk vor dem Untergang der Manner von Stalingrad. Dreihundertdreiβigtausend deutsche Manner hat die geniale Strategie des Weltkriegsgefreiten sinn- und verantwortungslos in Tod und Verderben gehetzt. Führer, wir danken dir!’); also printed in Hinrich Siefken (ed.), Die Weiβe Rose und ihre Flugblätter, Manchester, 1994, 32. This was the sixth and final broadsheet. The fifth, produced between 13 and 29 January, is printed (wrongly dated to 18 February 1943) alongside other texts related to the ‘White Rose’ in Peter Steinbach and Johannes Tuchel (eds.), Widerstand in Deutschland 1933–1945. Ein historisches Lesebuch, Munich, 1994, 236–7 (trans, in N & P, iv.457) and reproduced in facsimile in Siefken, Die Weiβe Rose und ihre Flugblätter, 88–9 (see 20–1 for dating). See also J. P. Stern, ‘The White Rose’, in Hinrich Siefken (ed.), Die Weiβe Rose. Student Resistance to National Socialism 1942/43. Forschungsergebnisse und Erfahrungsberichte, Nottingham, n.d. (1991), 11–36.
385. Benz and Pehle, Lexikon, 318–19.
386. See IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.79: Hitler was on the evening of the news of the fall of Stalingrad ‘a tired old man (ein müder alter Herrn)’, and the mood at headquarters reminded her of a visit to a cemetery on a rainy November day. See also Irving, HW, 480. According to Speer, 264, after the capitulation Hitler never referred to Stalingrad again.
387. TBJG, II/7, 171 (23 January 1943).
388. Schroeder, 130; TBJG, II/7, 171 (23 January 1943).
389. See Irving, HW, 480.
390. Below, 326.
391. Below, 329–30.
392. TBJG, II/7, 285 (8 February 1943).
393. TBJG, II/ 7, 293 (8 February 1943).
394. TBJG, II/7, 285–6 (8 February 1943); also 287–8, 293–5.
395. TBJG, II/ 7, 288–9 (8 February 1943).
396. TBJG, II/ 7, 287 (8 February 1943).
397. Below, 327.
398. TBJG, II/ 7, 287 (8 February 1943).
399. TBJG, II/ 7, 291–2 (8 February 1943).
400. TBJG, II/ 7, 290–2, 294 (8 February 1943).
401. TBJG, II/ 7, 295–6 (8 February 1943).
402. TBJG, II/ 7, 295–7, (8 February 1943).
403. TBJG, II/ 7, 292 (8 February 1943).
404. TBJG, II/7, 296 (8 February 1943).
405. The speech had been postponed from 14 March (RGBl, 1 943 I, 137; Domarus, 1998). Hitler indicated at the beginning of his speech (Domarus, 1999) that the postponement had been caused by the crisis on the eastern front. This had — temporarily — been ended by the retaking of Kharkov (which the Red Army had regained in February) on 14–15 March (KTB OKW, ii/2, 209 (14 March 1943), 214–15 (15 March 1943).
406. TBJG, II/7, 593–4, 607, 611 (20 March 1943).
407. TBJG, II/7, 610 (20 March 1943).
408. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 196–7. The figures probably seemed far too low because most people conflated them with the total casualties. In Haider’s last note of casualties on the eastern front before he left office, he gave the total killed for the period between 22 June 1941 and 10 September 1942 as 336,349, and the total losses (killed, wounded, missing) as 1,637,280 (Haider KTB, iii.522 (15 September 1942). The figure for dead provided by Hitler in March 1943 was, therefore, less outlandish than it seemed to his audience. Many presumed Hitler was referring only to dead on the eastern front, not in all theatres of war. But the eastern front in any case accounted for the vast proportion of those killed in action.
409. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 207–10.
<p>CHAPTER 12: BELEAGUERED</p>
