36. Salter, ‘Mobilisation’, 76–81; Stephen Salter, ‘Class Harmony or Class Conflict? The Industrial Working Class and the National Socialist Regime 1933–1945’, in Jeremy Noakes (ed.),
37. Rebentisch, 478.
38. Rebentisch, 479.
39. Speer, 265.
40. Speer, 266; Rebentisch, 480.
41. Speer, 268; Rebentisch, 479 and n.332.
42. See Rebentisch, 481ff.
43. Speer, 270–71.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48. Speer, 270–71.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55. Speer, 271.
56.
57.
58.
59. Speer, 271 and 553 n.5.
60. Rebentisch, 460, 498. Bormann’s influence was indeed great, and growing. Above all, his proximity to Hitler and control of the access of others (with important exceptions) to the Führer, in addition to his leadership of the Party, gave him his unique position of power. But in 1943, Lammers was able for the most part to hold his own, and come to a working arrangement with Bormann, in matters relating to the state administration. Later, his own access to Hitler was increasingly circumscribed by Bormann, whose power was at its peak in the final phase of the Third Reich (Rebentisch, 459–63, 531). Even then, however, Bormann had no independent power, but remained, as Lammers put it, ‘a true interpreter of Adolf Hitler’s directives’ (cit. Rebentisch, 83, n.182 (and see also 498)).
61. Speer, 274;
62.
63.
64.
65. Speer, 275–6;
66.
67. Rebentisch, 495.
68. Speer, 278 (claiming it arose from Göring’s morphine addiction). A medical examination by the Americans in 1945 revealed Göring’s dependence on dihydro-codeine, whose effects and level of addiction were only a fraction of those of morphine (Irving,
69. Irving,
70. Speer, 279.
71.
72. Rebentisch, 482–3.
73. Rebentisch, 483–4.
74. Rebentisch, 485–6.
75. Rebentisch, 486–7.
76. Rebentisch, 489–90. According to one report, from Vienna, of 84,000 who had reported there under the ‘combing-out action’, closures had yielded only 3,600 men, of whom a mere 384 were useful for the armed forces (Rebentisch, 490).
77. See Steinert, 332ff.
78. StA Würzburg, SD/13, report of SD-Auβenstelle Bad Kissingen, 22 April 1943:
79. For a brief sketch of Weber’s character and career, see
80. All the above rests on Rebentisch, 490–92.
81. Guderian, 288.
82. See Churchill, IV, ch.xxxviii for a description of the conference and 615 for Churchill’s surprise. The surprise was somewhat disingenuous. As Churchill admitted, and the minutes of the war cabinet of 20 January showed, he had already before the Casablanca Conference approved the notion of stipulating a demand for ‘unconditional surrender’. For the implications — often exaggerated — of the demand for ‘Unconditional Surrender’, see Gruchmann,
