105. Speer, 393–4. The unease about Himmler was not altogether ungrounded. Himmler had been aware since at least autumn 1943 of ‘some sort of dark plans’ brewing and, with Hitler’s permission, had taken up contact with Popitz and, through him, other members of the conspiracy. The intermediary role was played by Himmler’s lawyer, Dr Carl Langbehn, who, as Himmler knew, had sympathized with the opposition since before the war. Himmler was obviously playing a double game. On the one hand, he was careful to demonstrate his loyalty to Hitler, pointing out to the dictator that should any rumours reach him over his contact with the opposition, he should know that his motives were beyond question. Hitler acknowledged that he had complete trust in the Reichsführer. On the other hand, Himmler was well aware that the regime’s days were numbered and that Hitler presented a block on any room for manoeuvre. He wanted to keep his options open, and to maintain a possible escape route should it prove necessary (Speer, 390; Ritter, 360–62; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 367–8; and Hedwig Maier, ‘Die SS und der 20.Juli 1944’, VFZ, 14 (1966), 299–316, here especially 311–14). It seems, nevertheless, doubtful that Himmler had an inkling of specific plans to topple Hitler on 20 July. It has been suggested that he was slow to act, leaving the Wolf’s Lair belatedly, and only appearing around midnight to take charge of putting down the coup (Padfield, Himmler, 498–514). But he was prompt enough in addressing security issues at FHQ directly following the attempt, where he appeared with his entourage within an hour of the bomb exploding (Hoffmann, Widerstand, 503, 824). He was required to accompany Hitler at the visit of Mussolini later that afternoon, which delayed his departure for Berlin. Probably, too, he waited to confer with the head of the Security Police, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, at that very time en route to the Wolf’s Lair, before leaving for the Reich capital. On arrival in Berlin, some time would have been taken up with coordinating the crushing of a military uprising whose ramifications, at that time, were still uncertain.
106. Speer, 393.
107. See Remer’s account in: Hans Adolf Jacobsen (ed.), Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung. Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20.Juli 1944 in der SD-Berichterstattung. Geheime Dokumente aus dent ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1984, ii.637ff.; also Hoffmann, Widerstand, 528, 594–5.
108. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 528.
109. Otto Ernst Remer, 20.Juli 1944, Hamburg, 1951, 12; repeated with minor variations in Otto Ernst Remer, Verschwörung und Verrat um Hitler. Urteil eines Frontsoldaten, Preußisch-Oldendorf, 1981, 33. Similar wording is given by Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, B1.84. Linge was, he said, in the room as Hitler spoke. See also Jacobsen, Spiegelbild, 639. It is unlikely that Hitler immediately promoted Remer to colonel, as Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, B1.84, claimed. (See Hoffmann, Widerstand, 597 and 854 n.343.)
110. Speer, 394–5; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 594–8. See also Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 563–4; Remer, 20.Juli 1944, Hamburg, 1951, 12; Remer, Verschwörung und Verrat um Hitler, 33–4; and Hagen’s report, Spiegelbild, 12–15.
111. 111. Germans against Hitler, 147, for the time.
112. Domarus, 2127 gives the time of the broadcast, at Hitler’s bidding, as 6.30p.m.; Speer, 395–6, recalls the broadcast as ‘towards seven o’clock in the evening’; Reuth, Goebbels, 550, gives the time of the broadcast as 6.45p.m..
113. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 599.
114. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 608, 613.
115. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 616.
116. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 620–26; Fest, Staatsstreich, 277–9.
117. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 570.
118. IMG, xxxiii.417–18, D0C.3881–PS; Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 570–71 (with some textual variation); Zeller, 397–8; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 623–5; Fest, Staatsstreich, 279–80.
119. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 623ff.; Fest, Staatsstreich, 280–81; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 276–7.
120. Schroeder, 148; Domarus, 2123.
121. Domarus, 2124; Schmidt, 595.
