43. According to Speer’s later claim, Hitler watched it over and again (Toland, 818, cit. Speer’s interview for Playboy, June 1971). Luftwaffe adjutant Below remarked, on the other hand, that Hitler showed little interest in the photographs of the executions, which were bandied about Führer Headquarters in repulsive fashion by SS-Gruppenführer Hermann Fegelein, Himmler’s liaison officer at the Wolf’s Lair (Below, 385). Walter Frentz, Hitler’s cameraman, based at Führer Headquarters and frequently a guest at the evening monologues, also claimed, long after the war, that the films had arrived there, but that Fegelein was the only one to have seen them (Hoffmann, Widerstand, 872).
44. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 652, 864–5, note 33, 874, note 123; and see Germans against Hitler, 202–9, 214–19.
45. See Irving, Doctor, 151–2. He told his military entourage at the end of the month that he ought to have spent ten to fourteen days in bed, but had carried on working at least eight hours a day (LB Darmstadt, 271 (31 July 1944)).
46. Irving, Doctor, 154.
47. Irving, Doctor, 150.
48. Redlich, 204–6; Schenck, 302, 318; Irving, Doctor, 152–3; LB Darmstadt, 270 (31 July 1944) (where Hitler ruled out flying for at least a further eight days until his ears were healed); TBJG, II/13, 209 (3 August 1944), 232 (5 August 1944).
49. Bormann Letters, 68.
50. Redlich, 205.
51. Irving, Doctor, 150; TBJG, II/13, 213 (3 August 1944).
52. Irving, Doctor, 149 (Giesing’s impressions), 157 (those of Lieutenant-General Werner Kreipe); TBJG, II/13, 209 (3 August 1944) (Goebbels’s impressions); and see Schenck, 394–5.
53. LB Darmstadt, 270 (31 July 1944).
54. Schenck, 250, cit. Morell’s diary entry of 3 October 1944; Redlich, 205.
55. Irving, Doctor, 153 (Morell diary entry for 29 July 1944); LB Darmstadt, 217 (31 July 1944).
56. Irving, Doctor, 160; Redlich, 205.
57. Hoffmann, Security, 253–4; Zoller, 186.
58. TBJG, II/13, 210 (3 August 1944); Warlimont, 442.
59. Zoller, 186.
60. Guderian, 342, and 339–40 for his appointment.
61. See TBJG, II/13, 207 (3 August 1944), where Goebbels writes that propaganda must play its part in preventing an inverted version of the 1918 stab-in-the-back. Then, in his view, the home-front had subverted the military effort; now, the military had threatened to undermine the home-front.
62. Schroeder, 149.
63. IMG, xvi. 541; Speer, 403.
64. KTBOKW, iv. 2, 1572–6.
65. LB Darmstadt, 275–7, 280; LB Stuttgart, 609–20.
66. See above, Ch. 14, note 5.
67. Propaganda directives immediately after the putsch attempt referred specifically to it as a failed ‘stab-in-the-back’ (see Steinert, 475).
68. Steinert, 472–3.
69. BA, R55/614, R55/678, ‘“Treukundgebungen” nach den 20.7.44; insbes. Berichte über einzelne Veranstaltungen und Stimmung nach dem Attentat’; Imperial War Museum, London (= IWM), ‘Aus deutschen Urkunden 1935–1945’, unpublished collection of captured documents, n.d., c.1945–6, 289–92 (instructions from the Reich Propaganda Ministry to Gauleiter and Gau Propaganda Offices, regarding ‘Treukundgebungen anläßlich des mißlungenen Attentates auf den Führer’); MadR, xvii.6684–6 (28 July 1944); Steinert, 476ff.; Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939–1945, London, 1979, 388.
70. Spiegelbild, 1–3. For the utterly contrasting reactions — based on newspaper reports and rumour — of remaining, anxiety-ridden Jews in Dresden, see the entries in Klemperer, ii.548–54 (21–28 July 1944).
71. In fact, British plans to assassinate Hitler had been formulated only a few weeks earlier than Stauffenberg’s attempt on the dictator’s life. Among the arguments used by staff officers within the British subversive agency, Special Operations Executive, to oppose a British assassination attempt — which, in any case, was almost a dead letter at the very time it was conceived — was the view that it would prove counter-productive in stirring up support for Hitler (and thereby making a post-war settlement more difficult). It was also felt ‘that, from the strictly military point of view, it was almost an advantage that Hitler should remain in control of German strategy, having regard to the blunders that he has made’ (Operation Foxley, 14–15, 30–31).
72. Spiegelbild, 4–7.
73. Spiegelbild, 8–11.
