Итог полностью

Louche [skewed]. This word is used, in grammatical contexts, to indicate expressions which seem at first to introduce one meaning but which go on to determine an entirely different one. It is used in particular of phrases whose construction is equivocal to the point of disturbing their clarity of expression. What renders a phrase skewed arises therefore in the specific disposition of the words which compose it, when they seem at first glance to create a certain relation, although in fact they enjoy a different one: just as skew-eyed people seem to look in one direction, while they are actually looking somewhere else,

M. Beauz^e, Encyclopedic methodique. grammairc et litterature, vol. 2

The specialized languages that schools of specialists produce and reproduce through the systematic alteration of the common language are, as with all discourses, the product of a compromise between an expressive interest and a censorship constituted by the very structure of the field in which the discourse is produced and circulates. This ‘compromise formation', tn the Freudian sense, is more or less ‘successful’ depending on the specific competence of the producer, and is the product of strategies of euphemization that consist in imposing form as well as observing formalities. These strategies tend to guarantee the satisfaction of the expressive interest, biological drive or political interest (in the broad sense of the term), within the limits of the structure of opportunities for material or symbolic profit which the different forms of discourse can procure for different

producers according to their position in the field, that is, in the structure of the distribution of the specific capital which is at stake in this field.¹

The metaphor of censorship should not mislead: it is the structure of the field itself which governs expression by governing both access to expression and the form of expression, and not some legal proceeding which has been specially adapted to designate and repress the transgression of a kind of linguistic code. This structural censorship is exercised through the medium of the sanctions of the field, functioning as a market on which the prices of different kinds of expression are formed; it is imposed on all producers of symbolic goods, including the authorized spokesperson, whose authoritative discourse is more subject to the norms of official propriety than any other, and it condemns the occupants of dominated positions either to silence or to shocking outspokenness. The need for this censorship to manifest itself in the form of explicit prohibitions, imposed and sanctioned by an institutionalized authority, diminishes as the mechanisms which ensure the allocation of agents to different positions (and whose very success ensures their anonymity) are increasingly capable of ensuring that the different positions are occupied by agents able and inclined to engage in discourse (or to keep silent) which is compatible with the objective definition of the position. (This explains the importance which co-optation procedures always grant to the apparently insignificant indices of the disposition to observe formalities.) Censorship is never quite as perfect or as invisible as when each agent has nothing to say apart from what he is objectively authorized to say: in this case he does not even have to be his own censor because he is, in a way. censored once and for all, through the forms of perception and expression that he has internalized and which impose their form on all his expressions.