Итог полностью

The ‘special language’ distinguishes itself from scientific language in that it conceals heteronomy behind the appearance of autonomy: being unable to function without the aid of ordinary language, it must produce the illusion of independence through strategies which create a false break, using procedures that differ according to the field and. when in the same field, according to positions and moments. This language can, for example, mimic the fundamental property of all scientific language: the determination of an element through its membership of a system? The words which pure science borrows from ordinary language derive their entire meaning from the system constructed, and the option (often inevitable) of resorting to a common word rather than a neologism or a pure and arbitrary symbol can only be chosen - in keeping with a correct methodology -through the desire to utilize the capacity sometimes possessed by language to portray hitherto unsuspected relations, when it functions as a depository for a collective endeavour.⁴ The word 'group¹ used by mathematicians is a perfectly self-sufficient symbol because it is entirely defined by the operations and the relations which define its specific structure and which are the source of its properties. Conversely, most of the special usages of the word that are listed by dictionaries (e.g. in painting, ‘the gathering of several characters constituting an organic unity in a work of art¹, or in economics, ‘a set of enterprises united by diverse links’) have only a low level of autonomy in relation to the first meaning and would remain unintelligible for anyone who did not have a working knowledge of that meaning.

The Heideggerian words that are borrowed from ordinary language are numberless, but they are transfigured by the process of imposing form which produces the apparent autonomy of philosophical language by inserting them, through the systematic accentuation of morphological relations, into a network of relations manifested in the concrete form of the language and thereby suggesting that each element of the discourse depends on the others simultaneously as signifier and as signified. Thus a word as ordinary

as Fiirsorge (solicitude), becomes palpably attached by its very form to a whole set of words from the same family: Sorge (care), Sorgfalt (carefulness), Sorglosigkeit (negligence, carelessness), sorgenvoll (concerned), besorgt (preoccupied), Lebenssorge (concern for life), Selbstsorge (self-interest). The play on words of the same root -which is very common in the dictums and proverbs found in all popular wisdom - is only one of the formal means, if doubtless the most reliable, of giving the impression that there is a necessary relation between two signifieds. The association by alliteration or by assonance, which establishes quasi-material relations of resemblance of form and of sound, can also produce formally necessary associations likely to bring to light a hidden relation between the signifieds or, more probably, to bring it into existence solely by virtue of the play on forms: it is, for example, the philosophical puns of the later Heidegger, Denken = Danken (thinking = thanking), or the sequence of plays on words relating to Sorge ah besorgende Fiirsorge, the notion of ‘care as concernful solicitude', which would elicit accusations of verbalism were it not for the pattern of morphological allusions and etymological cross-references creating the illusion of a global coherence of form, and therefore of sense, and, as a consequence, the illusion of the necessity of discourse: ‘Die Entschlossenheit aber ist nur die in die Sorge gesorgte und als Sorge mbgliche Eigentlichkeit dieser selbst' (‘Resoluteness, however, is only that authenticity which, in care, is the object of care, and which is possible as care - the authenticity of care itself).⁵