Итог полностью

reserving the right to repudiate this in the name of the essential inexhaustibility of the work, which may lead one to accept or, equally, to reject any interpretation, by virtue of the transcendent power of its creative force, which is also expressed as a power of criticism and self-criticism. Heidegger’s philosophy is unquestionably the first and the most accomplished of the ready-made philosophical creations, works made to be interpreted and made by interpretation or, more precisely, by the interactions between the interpreter who necessarily proceeds by excess and the producer who, through his refutations, amendments and corrections, establishes an unbridgeable gulf between the work and any particular interpretation.⁴*

The analogy is less artificial than it appears at first sight: by establishing that the sense of the ’ontological difference' which separates his thought from all previous thought⁴⁷ is also what separates ‘popular’, pre-ontological and naively ‘anthropological’ interpretations (as is Sartre’s, according to Heidegger) from authentic ones, Heidegger places his work out of reach and condemns in advance any reading which, whether intentionally or not, would limit itself to its vulgar meaning and which would, for example, reduce the analysis of 'inauthentic' existence to a sociological description, as some well-intentioned but wrong-headed interpreters have done, and as the sociologist also does, but with a totally different purpose. By positing within the work itself a distinction between two different readings of it. Heidegger finds himself well placed to persuade the consenting reader, when faced with the most disconcerting puns or the most blatant platitudes, to seek guidance from the master. The reader may of course understand only too well, but he is persuaded to doubt the authenticity of his own understanding, and to prohibit himself from judging a work which has been set up once and for all as the yardstick of its own comprehension. Like a priest who. as Weber observes, has the means to make the lay person carry the responsibility for the failure of the cultural enterprise, the great priestly prophecy thus guarantees the complicity of the interpreters who have no option but to pursue and recognize the necessity of the work, even through accidents, shifts and lapses, or find themselves cast out into the darkness of ‘error’ or, even better, ‘errance'.

Here, in passing, is a remarkable example of interpretation mania, calling on the combined resources of the international interpreters’ guild, in order to avoid the simplistic, as denounced in advance by a magisterial pun: ‘In English this term (errance) is an artefact with the following

warrant: The primary sense of the Latin errare is “to wander", the secondary sense "to go astray" or "to err”, in the sense of "to wander from the right path". This double sense is retained in the French errer. Jn English, the two senses are retained in the adjectival form, "errant": the first sense (“to wander") being used to describe persons who wander about searching for adventure (vg. “knights errant"); the second sense signifying "deviating from the true or correct", “erring". The noun form, “errance", is not justified by normal English usage, but we introduce it ourselves (following the example of the French translators, pp. 96 ff.). intending to suggest both nuances of "wandering about” and of "going astray" ("erring"), the former the fundament of the latter. This seems to be faithful to the author's intentions and to avoid as much as possible the simplest interpretations that would spontaneously arise by translating as "error".'⁴’’