The great geopolitical interests that are at stake here must not be underestimated and the choices that are made now will have deep and lasting consequences for the future of the European continent. What, exactly, is at stake becomes clear from the comment of the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Füle, who said that the “creation of a free trade zone between Ukraine and the European Union, to which Ukraine aspires, is incompatible with Ukrainian membership of the [Russia dominated] Common Economic Area’s customs union.”[27] Anders Åslund, a political analyst, declared that he “does not believe there are any real economic benefits in the customs union for Russia.”[28] Economic benefits were certainly not Putin’s main motivation for launching this project. In the long run also the benefits for the eventual partner countries are restricted—in particular for Ukraine. Putin, however, did his best to minimize the benefits for Ukraine of an association agreement with the EU, saying that “Ukraine sells Europe two litres of milk, [while] the Customs Union brings her 9 billion dollar per year.”[29] One may ask oneself why the customs union—despite its limited economic rationale for Russia—is so important for Moscow. One reason was possibly Russia’s aspiration to become a member of the World Trade Organization. After the Russian invasion and dismemberment of Georgia it was clear that Georgia, which already was a WTO member, would be inclined to block Russian membership. Putin first declared that Russia was no longer interested in becoming a member of the WTO. Later, however, he changed his tactics, and in June 2009 he announced that Russia wanted to join the WTO as a single customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. This collective application would make it more difficult for Georgia to block Russia’s WTO membership. But this option had to be dropped because there were too many technical obstacles. Thereupon Moscow declared that the three countries would negotiate individually, but harmonize their positions and enter the WTO together. Putin sought—and got—the support of the United States and the European Union to put pressure on Tbilisi. Things were, however, not so easy. The government of Mikheil Saakashvili said it could accept a Russian WTO membership only if Georgian customs officials would man the border posts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a demand that was unacceptable to Moscow because it would mean that the Kremlin would recognize Georgian sovereignty over the two breakaway territories.[30] Finally, in November 2011, a compromise was signed, brokered by the Swiss government. The parties agreed on international monitoring of trade along the mutual borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
WTO membership, however, was not the real reason behind the launch of the customs
union. The real reason was
The CSTO: A Mini-Warsaw Pact?
