Another vector used to project Russian power in the post-Soviet space is security
cooperation. This was originally organized within the framework of the CIS. Immediately
after the demise of the Soviet Union, in May 1992, a Treaty on Collective Security,
the “Tashkent Treaty,” was signed. It was Putin, who, in May 2002, took the initiative
to transform this platform and make it into a new, separate organization and rename
it the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Six former Soviet republics
became members of this mini-Warsaw Pact: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan (the core states
that also form the customs union), plus Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Uzbekistan
joined in 2006. The member states are not allowed to join other military alliances,
and there is a collective security guarantee (article 4), similar to article 5 of
the Washington Treaty. Membership is made attractive by Moscow by offering the member
states the possibility of buying military equipment in Russia at cost price. With
the CSTO Moscow pursued two main objectives:
First, to bind the participating countries in such a way that it would become more
difficult to leave the organization.
Second, to declare an exclusive zone of operation from which other security organizations
and third countries (meaning: NATO, but implicitly also China) are excluded.
The first objective is pursued by a progressive integration of the command and control
functions, including a common air defense, and the formation of a CSTO rapid reaction
force. The second goal—to claim for the CSTO an exclusive zone of operation from which
other security organizations are excluded—was one of the objectives of President Medvedev’s
proposal for a new Pan European security treaty, launched in 2008.[34] Neither NATO, nor the United States, has agreed to grant Moscow via the CSTO such
an exclusive droit de regard in the former Soviet space. Moscow, however, will continue its efforts to become the
“Gendarme of Eurasia.”[35] That this role for the Kremlin also has its limitations became clear in June 2010,
when during the ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan the Kyrgyz government asked for Russian
peacekeepers in the region and Moscow did not respond—notwithstanding the fact that
the events took place in a region in which Moscow claims to have “privileged interests.”
Apparently the Kremlin knew that peacekeeping in this case would not bring any direct
benefits to Russia, but would rather be an ungrateful and costly job. These were not
the only problems. After his comeback as president in May 2012, Putin went to Uzbekistan.
According to Fyodor Lukyanov this visit was “an attempt to reset relations with this
recalcitrant and most unreliable CSTO ally whose position stands in the way of making
this organization a working military and political alliance.”[36] Putin’s visit did not help. On June 28, 2012, Uzbekistan, the country that has
the most significant armed forces in Central Asia, suddenly suspended its membership
of the organization. The reason was the deep mistrust in Tashkent concerning the Russian
intentions. These intentions evoke the specter of the infamous Brezhnev doctrine,
because they include inter alia “to lower the threshold for intervention within the organization’s region, shift
the respective decisionmaking mechanisms from a consensus to a majority rule, and
develop a joint task force.”[37] According to the defense specialist Vladimir Socor, Uzbekistan’s departure showed
that “this organization is purely symbolic. . . . The CSTO is mainly a symbol of Russia’s
aspiration to become a great power and to be regarded as the leader of a bloc.”[38] But also symbolic organizations can bite. On April 11, 2013, Serbia was granted
observer status at the Parliamentary Assembly of the CSTO (PA CSTO), showing that
the CSTO had a certain attraction for a future EU member state. Afghanistan was equally
granted observer status. “This is another confirmation,” said Sergey Naryshkin, president
of the Duma and the Parliamentary Assembly of the CSTO, “that the PA CSTO has weight
and is taken seriously on the international stage.”[39]
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization:
A Double-Edged Sword?
