235. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 779, l. 47. The policy shift (“New Turn”) was confirmed at a Mongolia People’s party extraordinary plenum June 29–30, 1932, with Soviet advisers present. Genden attacked the leftists and pronounced the noncapitalist path a failure in Mongol conditions. By Sept. 1, Stalin would add himself to the politburo’s Mongolian commission. (He had named Voroshilov to replace Karakhan as chairman.) On Nov. 10, the politburo would approve a telegram from Eliava to the Mongols (copy to Okhtin) instructing the Mongolian Central Committee to remove all “leftists,” amnesty rank and file rebels who turned in their weapons, and call out the leaders of the uprising as Chinese agents and Japanese imperialists seeking to end Mongolia’s independence. Soon the Soviets were asking about Mongolia’s mobilization possibilities in the event of war with Japan. RGANI, f. 89, op. 63, d. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9; Roshchin, Politicheskaia istoriia Mongolii, 254–65.
236. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 175 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 38, l. 60). Without irony Stalin advised Kaganovich (June 7, 1932) that “the bureaucrats at Pravda have replaced letters from workers and collective farmers with letters from professional correspondents and ‘plenipotentiaries’. But the bureaucrats have to be reined in. Otherwise, Pravda risks falling utterly out of touch with live human beings at factories and collective farms.” Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 149 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 58–60). Kaganovich had the new rubric created, “Letters from workers and collective farmers” (164: f. 558, op. 11, d. 740, l. 37–43; f. 17, op. 114, d. 302, l. 13. 166: f. 558, op. 11, d. 740, l. 43–52).
237. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 180–1 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 100, l. 152).
238. Pyrih et al., Holodomor, 33–6 (RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 139, l. 162–5). “Do you realize what is happening in the lands around Belaia Tserkov, Uman, and Kiev?” G. I. Tkachenko, a twenty-year-old Ukrainian student, wrote to Ukrainian party boss Kosior on June 18, 1932. “There are vast areas of land not sown . . . In collective farms in which there were 100–150 horses, there are now only 40–50, and these are dying off. The population is terribly hungry.” Rudich, Holod 1932–1933 rokiv, 183–5. In March 1932, Kosior had managed to procure a seed loan for Ukraine of 110,000 tons from storehouses in better-off regions outside Ukraine (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 12, l. 30). On April 29, 1932, the politburo advanced a further seed loan to collective farms in Ukraine (l. 115–6).
239. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 335.
240. The politburo (June 21) formally resolved to summon them, but in the meantime refused additional emergency aid to Ukraine. Khlevniuk, Stalin i Kaganaovich, 163–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 740, l. 37–42: June 12, 1932), 169 (f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 62–3: June 15, 1932), 168–9n5. That day, a telegram in the names of Stalin and Molotov admonished the Ukrainian hierarchy that “no manner of deviation—regarding either amounts or deadlines set for grain deliveries—can be permitted from the plan established for your region for collecting grain from collective and private [family] farms or for delivering grain to state farms.” Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 242n3; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 230n3; Rudich, Holod 1932–1933 rokiv, 190.
241. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 187 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 77, l. 83–5).
242. The politburo (in July 1932) would formally approve slight reductions. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 197–8 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 81–7), 198n3 (f. 17 op. 162, d. 13, l. 11, 30, 133). Stalin was showing a bit of uncharacteristic flexibility, writing to Kaganovich and Molotov (June 26, 1932) that Sheboldayev might be right in suggesting that rural consumer cooperatives be freed from enacting state grain procurements, while their role as distributors of industrial goods to the countryside should be enhanced and their taxes reduced. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 197–8 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 81–7). On June 25, 1932, the decree “On Revolutionary Legality” stipulated criminal prosecution of officials who violated the law in dealings with peasants and protected judges from dismissal. Enforcement of the decree was another matter. Solomon, Reforming Justice, 193.
243. The Soviet Union was by no means alone in its emphasis on heavy over light bombers at this time. Bailes, “Technology and Legitimacy,” 381–406.
