262. Cairns added that “what surprised me most in Kiev was not what the people said (although conditions there seemed to be worse than in any place I visited in the next five weeks), but that they should all—young, middleaged and old alike—be unanimous and that none of them seemed to care what they said or who heard them, even the police and GPU.” Carynnyk et al., Foreign Office, 13, 51, 42, 105, 111. See also Cairns, Soviet Famine. “There’s no bread, no meat, no fats—nothing,” a senior OGPU official in Leningrad is said to have told the British ambassador. Haslam, “Political Opposition,” 396 (citing FO 371/16322: Strang to Simon in London, Aug. 14, 1932).
263. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 235–6 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 106–13: July 20, 1932), 240–1 (d. 100, l. 137–40: before July 24, 1932). The methods of theft could be ingenious. Kondrashin and Penner, Golod, 135–7. Stalin was keen to institutionalize the importance of socialist property in social consciousness. Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice, 119, 222–3. “State socialist property” was theorized as synonymous with “people’s patrimony.” Stuchka, Kurs Sovetskogo grazhdanskogo prava, III: 29.
264. RGAPSI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 895, l. 14 (politburo Aug. 2/8); Sobranie zakonov, 1932, article 360; Kollektivizatsiia sel’skogo khoziaistva, 423–4; Davies, Crisis and Progress, 242–56. See also Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism, 21.
265. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 273–5 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 144–51). A second decree, “On the struggle with speculation,” stipulating sentences of five to ten years, followed on Aug. 22: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 896, l. 13; Sobranie zakonov, 1932, article 375. This, too, had come from Stalin’s instructions on holiday. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 243–4 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 740, l. 104–11); Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 316 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 13, l. 52); RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 896, l. 13.
266. Pravda, Aug. 9, 1932. See also Izvestiia TsIK SSSR i VTsIK, Aug. 8, 1932. Already, places of confinement were far over capacity.
267. Zelenin et al., Istoriia sovetskogo krest’iantsva, II: 428–9n137 (citing RGAE, f. 1562, op. 152, d. 29, l. 58, 29). In the RSFSR alone, more than 160,000 people were convicted under the law in the first year alone. Werth and Mironenko, Istoriia stalinskogo gulaga, I: 135–8.
268. The names are crossed out from the record of the meeting. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 256–8 (personal archive of Kaganovich); Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, III: 418–9 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 106–13, 117, 121–3, 144–5, 151; d. 100, l. 1–7).
269. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 273–5 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 144–51).
270. Polish intelligence was still sending ethnic Ukrainian agents across the border on espionage missions, but almost all were being caught, as Stalin knew from intercepted Japanese correspondence out of Warsaw. Mikulicz, Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej, 110–5; Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead, 220–1. Japan cooperated with Poland to support Ukrainian anti-Communist nationalists, but Soviet intelligence knew this, too, having penetrated Ukrainian groups abroad. Sotskov, Neizvestnyi separatizm, 75–81. On Soviet-Polish prisoner exchanges, including spies, see Pepłoński, Wywiad Polski na ZSSR, 122–3. See also Gronskii, Iz proshlogo, 147–8.
271. Stanisław Patek, the Polish envoy to the USSR, and Krestinsky had signed the pact in Moscow on July 25, 1932; it went into effect on Dec. 23, when ratifications were exchanged in Warsaw between Beck and Antononv-Ovseyenko. Ken and Rupasov, Politbiuro TsK VKP (b) i otnosheniia SSSR, 514–9; Ken, Moskva i pakt, 104.
272. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 283–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 740, l. 153–60: Aug. 16). Balytsky would not arrive in Ukraine as a special plenipotentiary until Nov. 1932; he would be promoted to republic OGPU chief in Feb. 1933. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 340 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 907, l. 20: Nov. 25, 1932); Shapoval et al., ChK-GPU-NKVD, 47–8, 436. But Stalin directed Kaganovich to bring the Red Army into the harvest campaign in Ukraine. Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, III: 460 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 79, l. 21).
