252. The politburo resolved “to accept the recommendation of comrade Stalin on a reduction of the planned grain procurement in Ukraine by 722,000 tons as an exception for those regions of Ukraine particularly suffering.” (That was from 5.8 million.) The politburo also resolved to summon Kosior to Moscow and to direct him, along with Kuibyshev and Kaganovich, to determine which regions in Ukraine to assign the reduced targets. Antipova et al., Golod v SSSR, 183 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 13, l. 75, 76: signed by Kaganovich, in Stalin’s absence); Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 241–2 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 78, l. 79–81: July 24, 1932). Stalin denied the Sept. 10, 1932, request from Ivan Kabakov, party boss in the Urals, for lower grain procurement targets. Then, on Sept. 22, he approved the distribution of 39,000 tons of grain to the Urals, instead of the previous 37,000. Antipova et al., Golod v SSSR, 184 (APRF, f. 3, op. 40, d. 81, l. 148), 185 (l. 149), 186 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 13, l. 131, 133, 134).
253. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 244–5 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 115–9); Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 182–3 (f. 17, op. 162, d. 13, l. 76: Aug. 17, 1932; l. 85: Sept. 1, 1932).
254. Peasants could not distinguish between rust and other diseases, a Soviet agronomist reported. But as Tauger has demonstrated, local officials, too, did not understand plant disease and, at harvest time, when they would discover that the crop had been rotted out, would wrongly blame social causes. Tauger, “Natural Disaster,” 15 (citing Na zaschitu urozhaia, 1933, no. 10: 14–6: S. E. Grushevoi; and RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 237, l. 388), 40–5.
255. A major contributing factor to the famine was the extreme deterioration in party-village relations. Penner, “Stalin and the Ital’ianka.” Whereas in 1928 there had been 1 horespower for every 3.63 hectares of land sown to grain, in 1932 the number was 1 for every 6.02 hectares. A. A. Barsov, Balans stoimostnykh obmenov, 85.
256. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 176–80 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 37, l. 49–51), 180–1 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 38, l. 68–71), 181–5 (d. 37, l. 54–9); f. 17, op. 162, d. 13, l. 6. According to Polish intelligence, between Oct. 1, 1932, and June 20, 1933, 20 Soviet soldiers sought asylum in Poland. Zdanovich, Organy, 507 (citing RGVA, f. 308, op. 3, d. 303, l. 2).
257. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 185–6 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 38, l. 76–7).
258. Zdanovich, Organy, 435–6 (citing TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 10, d. 94, l. 1, 3, 7: L. Ivanov). See also Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 162–3.
259. Rees, Decision-making in the Stalinist Command Economy, 43–4 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 894, l. 12; f. 79, op. 1, d. 376, l. 1–2: Kuibyshev’s memo; and RGASPI, f. 85, op. 29, d. 433, l. 1); Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe politburo, 125–6.
260. Lensen, Damned Inheritance, 365; DVP SSSR, XV: 465–8 (Spilvanek and Japanese journalist Fuse: Aug. 12, 1932), 479–81 (Troyanovsky-Karakhan, Aug. 19), 614–8, 798. Between Dec. 4 and 6, 1932, more than 4,000 Chinese, including 2,400 soldiers (11 generals among them), were taken into Soviet custody. After Japanese demands for their surrender, the Soviets decided to send them to Xinjiang, announcing that they were being sent out of USSR territory. Sladkovskii, Znakomomstvo s Kitaem i kitaitsami, 186 (citing Tsentral’nyi arkhiv porgrannichnykh voisk, f. 160, op. 2, d. 1, l. 7); Barmin, Sovetskii Soiuz i Sintszian, 124 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 15, l. 117); DVP SSSR, XV: 677; Izvestiia, Dec. 21, 1932.
261. From Jan. 1 through July 1, 1932, 1.37 million households quit collective farms in the RSFSR; 200,000 households quit in Ukraine. Zelenin, “By li ‘kolkhoznyi Neonep’?” 106 (citing RGAE, f. 7446, op. 14, d. 108, l. 34; op. 3, d. 364, l. 2; d. 378, l. 2; op. 2, d. 338, l. 57). The number collectivized by the end of 1932 (completion of the Five-Year Plan) was officially 14.9 million households, or 61.5 percent, rather than the target of 17.9 million.
