299. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 526 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 172, l. 105: Igor Sitnikov). Back on March 15, 1934, Artuzov had reported that Captain Makoto Tanaka of the Japanese army had reconnoitered parts of the Chinese Eastern Railway, possibly for sabotaging tunnels. Stalin underlined passages and wrote: “Comrade Artuzov, what should be the measures to counter explosions and in general diversionary activity? Who is working them out, who is implementing them?” Khaustov, Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 505–6 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 186, l. 115–6).
300. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 202–3 (Vaizer). See also, Khaustov, Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 526 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 172, l. 105: Igor Sitnikov).
301. Yagoda wrote to Stalin (Feb. 17, 1934) recommending removal of Smagin (b. 1894) as head of Red Army external relations. Smagin had served as an aide to the deputy head of military intelligence (1924–26) and then through May 1930 as an aide to the Soviet military attaché in Japan, Primakov, who had reported that a Japanese officer in a drunken state had uttered the secret code used for the head of Soviet military intelligence Berzin (“Crow”) and had referred to content in a classified report by Primakov. Only Primakov and Smagin knew that code name. Primakov’s report of the incident had not been properly investigated at the time. Smagin returned to Soviet military intelligence in Moscow, then, in July 1933, was appointed to his current post. Yagoda recommended against trying to turn Smagin against the Japanese. Stalin made a note to himself: “Speak with Klim.” Maybe Stalin decided, contrary to Yagoda, to try to “double” Smagin. But Smagin was removed in June 1934 and left unemployed. In Jan. 1935, he would be appointed to the Frunze Military Academy. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 482–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 186, l. 79–87); Lurie and Kochik, GRU, 303; RGVA, f. 37837, op. 1, d. 1300, l. 19ob.–27. In 1934, Kawabe would be named chief of intelligence to the Kwantung Army. Smagin would be arrested Dec. 16, 1937, and executed Aug. 26, 1938.
302. Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres, II: 364. “The mystique of the League,” notwithstanding its failures, “remained the essential element of our foreign policy as well as our domestic policy,” General Maurice Gamelin would later claim. Gamelin, Servir, II: 56; DDF, 1e série, IV: 258–62 (April 16, 1934).
303. Dullin, Men of Influence, 2, citing Leon Trotsky, Ouevres (Paris: EDI, 1985), XII: 107–9. Karakhan was banished as envoy to Ankara, and Sokolnikov by May 1934 to the timber commissariat. Their departures enhanced Litvinov’s position. But the party cell inside the commissariat kept a watchful, envious eye on Litvinov and his associates. Total foreign affairs personnel in the 1930s hovered around 1,000, including the central commissariat and the roughly 30 embassies and 40 to 50 consulates. Roshchin, “V narkomindele v predvoennye gody,” 41–9; Crowley, Soviet Diplomat Corps.
304. Bernard Attolico, the Italian envoy in Moscow, explained to Twardowski that the Soviets pursued “the policy of the free hand,” but “if there is no other way out, they would swallow the bitter pill, join the League of Nations and make an alliance with France, . . . unless German policy succeeded in meeting the Russian ‘pact mania’ in a form acceptable to them.” DGFP, series C, III: 150–1 (Twardowski, July 9, 1934).
305. Hochman, Failure of Collective Security, 37–44. Litvinov latched onto a renewed offer on April 20, 1934, by a new French foreign minister, the conservative nationalist Louis Barthou, to renew the talks begun under his predecessor for a regional alliance. In private talks with Germany, however, the Soviets distanced themselves from the “French idea.” AVP RF, f. 5, op. 14, pap. 103, d. 117; Na prieme, 128; DDF, 1e série, VI: 496–502.
306. Pravda, June 10, 1934; Wheeler-Bennet, Documents on International Affairs, I: 253ff. The thorny issue of Bessarabia was left unresolved. DVP SSSR, XVII: 379–81; Pravda, June 11, 1934; Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Evropa, 312 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 16, l. 59, 87, 89). DDF, 1e série, VI: 664–6. Diplomatic relations had been normalized with Hungary (Feb. 1934). “The Russians do not understand what dogs they could have against Europe in the form of Central European small states,” the Czechoslovak diplomat Jaroslav Papoušek had told the Soviet envoy in Prague, Alexandrovsky, on March 24, 1934, claiming to be citing President Masaryk. Ken and Rupasov, Zapadnoe prigranich’e, 123 (AVP RF, f. 0138, op. 15, pap. 122, d. 2, l. 226).
