39. Scholars have identified a “dictator’s dilemma”: the more power the dictator has, the less sure he can be of the loyalty of subordinates. Wintrobe, Political Economy of Dictatorship, 20. In all authoritarian regimes, the ruler perceives the only path to securing his rule is an expansion of his power at the expense of elites (who, in theory, can remove him). That said, elite palace coups are hard, whereas the ruler enjoys greater opportunity to behave opportunistically, to cut back the degree of power-sharing or collective decision making, and, once his power passes a certain point, rebellion becomes near impossible and participation in decision making shrinks or even vanishes. Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Machiavelli had argued that those who lead a country have more to fear from the scheming elites than from the populace, and therefore he advised a leader to form an alliance with the people against the aristocracy.
40. “The frenzy with which [Stalin] pursued the feud, making it the paramount preoccupation of international communism as well as of the Soviet Union and subordinating to it all political, tactical, intellectual, and other interests, beggars description,” Deutscher would write. “There is in the whole of history hardly another case in which such immense resources of power and propaganda were employed against a single individual.” Deutscher, Prophet Outcast, 125–6. See also Szamuely, “Elimination of Opposition,” 323.
CHAPTER 6. ON A BLUFF
1. Trotsky, Fourth International 2, no. 5 (1941): 150–4, reprinted in Trotsky, Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1936–1937.
2. Payne, Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 175–7. There would be some runoffs, reruns, and shifts in coalition allegiance, altering the totals.
3. On the problems of Spain’s democracy, some of them analogous to the situation in late Weimar Germany, see Payne, Spain’s First Democracy; and Preston, “Explosive Experiment.” Stalin might have received an intelligence warning about the Spanish generals’ plotting in April 1936. Mereshcheriakov, “SSSR i grazhdanskaia voina v Ispanii,” 84, no citation. Spanish conspirators had informed the British foreign office, in late May 1936, of an intention “to restore law and order,” that is, overthrow the Popular Front in favor of “a civilian, right-wing government.” The British cabinet, discussing Spain on July 6, knew a coup was imminent. Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent, 143 (citing PRO FO 371, file 20522, documents W4919 and W5693; records of the cabinet office, minutes, file 85); Coverdale, Italian Intervention, 60.
4. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 900; Preston, Spanish Holocaust.
5. This argument has been advanced by Khlevniuk and reinforced by Kuromiya, but rightly rejected by Rees. Khlevniuk, “Objectives of the Great Terror”; Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 173 (citing APRF, f. 3, op. 65, d. 223, l. 90, 141–2, 146); Khlevniuk, “Reasons for the ‘Great Terror’”; Kuromiya, “Accounting for the Great Terror”; Rees, “Stalin as Leader, 1937–1953.”
6. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 764–5 (APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 226, l. 159–61). The innermost circle—Kaganovich, Voroshilov—privately expressed their support to Stalin, at his prompting, for the annihilation of “lowlifes” such as Dreitser and Pikel. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 627 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 743, l. 53: Kaganovich to Stalin, July 6, 1936); Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 333–4 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 37, l. 104–6: Voroshilov to Stalin, July 9, 1936).
7. Volodarsky, Stalin’s Agent, 216. Publicly, Stalin did not comment much on Spain. Many military intelligence reports from Spain were addressed to Voroshilov. Radosh et al., Spain Betrayed, 58–63 (Sept. 25, 1936), 63–5 (Oct. 16, 1936), 66–70 (Oct. 16, 1936). A mass of documents regarding Spain in the so-called Politburo or Presidential Archive were addressed to Kaganovich (and sometimes Molotov) in Stalin’s absence, but Stalin’s voluminous holiday correspondence with Kaganovich does not elucidate his motives in Spain. Crucially, there is no Dimitrov diary from Jan. 31, 1935, to Aug. 19, 1936, or Sept. 21 to Nov. 22, 1936, when Dimitrov and his wife were on holiday.
