205. Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 115–6 (TsA FSB, ASD P-4615, l. 258–61; ASD N. 15301, tom 2: 37–8); Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChk, 170–6.
206. Tukhachevsky managed to clash not only with the partisan-war types of the civil war (Voroshilov, Budyonny, Kulik), but also old-line professionals, such as Shaposhnikov, whom Tukhachevsky derided as “cautious” and “an office Napoleon.” Koritskii et al., Tukhachevskii, 17. That said, Shaposhnikov’s earlier appointment to the general staff might have been on Tukhachevsky’s recommendation. Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 198–9 (RGASPI, f. 134, op. 3, d. 17, l. 65: Kollontai diary); Nord, “Marshal Tukhachevskii,” 114.
207. Zdanovich, Organy, 282–4 (citing TsA FSB, delo R-9000, t. 24, l. 1, l. 210, l. 48ob, l. 72.).
208. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 89–90.
209. German intelligence purportedly sought to exploit these appetites, too, sending the blond, blue-eyed singer Josephine Heinze Tukhachevsky’s way. Leskov, Stalin i zagovor Tukhachevskogo, 222–47.
210. Kantor, Zakliataia drzuhba, 295. German general Blomberg had described Tukhachevsky as “youthfully fresh, sociable, sympatisch . . . He withheld himself from conversations about any political themes, but was a talkative and purposeful conversationalist when touching upon the operational and tactical areas. A very winning persona.” Kantor, Voina i mir, 296–7, 300 (citing Blomberg’s private archive, “Reise des Chefs des Truppenamts nach Russland,” Aug.–Sept. 1928, 2–3, 14–16, 46).
211. Not long after Stalin had absolved Tukhachevsky, back in fall 1930, of plotting a seizure of power with the rightists, Voroshilov had forwarded two letters incriminating him, commenting that one “gave a brilliant and damning characterization.” The letters to Voroshilov were from Verkhovsky and Bergavinov, and forwarded to Stalin in Jan. 1931. Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 132. For hearsay about Tukhachevsky’s criticisms of Voroshilov for incompetence, including in front of others, see Nord, Marshal Tukhachevsky, 102; and Simonov, Glazami chloveka moeogo pokoleniia, 383 (Zhukov).
212. Uborevičius, known for his tactical and operational insight, mentored an extraordinary group of officers, including Semyon Timoshenko (b. 1895), Alexander Vasilevsky (b. 1895), Georgy Zhukov (b. 1896), Kirill Meretskov (b. 1897), Dmitry Pavlov (b. 1897), Ivan Konev (b, 1897), and Matvei Zakharov (b. 1898).
213. Svetlanin, Dal’nevostochnyi zagovor, 101 (the deputy was I. F. Fedko). In Sept. and Dec. 1936, the NKVD had received information that Blyukher was planning a military putsch. “M. N. Tukhachevskii i ‘voenno-fashistkii zagovor,’” 10.
214. This went far down the chain of command. “I feel that my every step is under observation,” remarked K. I. Sokolov-Strakhov, editor of the Military-Historical Bulletin, in comments that helped provoke his arrest. “It is hard and even frightening now to work on the literary-historical front.” (Sokolov-Strakhov was married to the niece of a former chief of the gendarmes.) Suvenirov, “Narkomat oborny,” 33, 56 (citing RGVA, f. 9, op. 39, d. 29, l. 5).
215. “The causes behind why I came to military intelligence are known to all,” Uritsky told the group’s “party active” on May 19, 1937. “The causes were a breach . . . I arrived here and there were people who did not help me much. You and I are bad intelligence agents.” Gorbunov, “Voennaia razvedka v 1934–1939 godakh” (no. 3), 57 (citing RGVA, f. 9, op. 30, d. 54, l. 26).
216. Rodina, 1995, no. 2: 87; Pogonii, Lubianka, 2, 203; Tumshis and Papchinskii, 1937, bol’shaia chistka, 404–6, 445–51. Artuzov would be executed on Aug. 21, 1937.
217. Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 299, 304, 307–10. Firin had helped supervise Stalin’s visit to the Moscow-Volga Canal on April 22, 1937, before being arrested on May 9 as a German spy. Kokurin and Petrov, “Gulag,” 114.
218. Sever and Kolpakidi, GRU, 358.
219. Stalin also underscored the need to portray Soviet spies as “genuine patriots, heroes, of their country,” in order “to attract youth, talented people, girls, scientists” to intelligence work, but warned that “the enemy’s strong intelligence and our weakness are a provocation to war.” Petrov and Jansen, Stalinskii pitomets, 290–3 (TsA FSB, f. 6, op. 5, d, 25, l. 208–10). See also Vinogradov, “Tret’ia reform organov bezopasnosti,” II: 76–96, esp. 93. One account has Stalin going in person, on May 22, 1937, to military intelligence HQ: Gorbunov, “Voennaia razvedka v 1934–1939 godakh” (no 3.), 57. On the consequences, see also Alekseev et al., Entsiklopediia voennoi razvedki, 508–9.
