68. Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Evropa, 301 (RGASPI, f. 71, op. 25, d. 3695); Laney, “Military Implementation of the Franco-Russian Alliance.” Pravda and Izvestiya voiced disappointment on the second anniversary of the signing of the May 2, 1935, Franco-Soviet Pact. By late 1937, even Litvinov had broached the possibility to a French correspondent of Soviet rapprochement with Nazi Germany, an attempted warning to Paris. Dreifort, “French Popular Front,” 222, citing Bullitt (Paris) to Sec. of State, June 17, 1937, State Department, no. 851.00/1684; Cot, Triumph of Treason, 362–3; Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 153–4.
69. DDF, 2e série, V: 311–2 (March 30, 1937), 363–5 (April 8), 507–9 (April 21), 510–1 (April 21), 613–4 (April 29), 614–5 (April 29), 615–8 (April 29); Coulondre, De Staline à Hitler, 44; Ford and Schorske, “Voice in the Wilderness,” 556–61.
70. Dreifort, “French Popular Front.” An internal French analysis—“Reflections on the Possible Consequences of Franco-Soviet military contacts” (May 1937)—had underscored how any deepening military ties with Moscow would risk alienating not just “Germany, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia,” but Great Britain. “French security rests above all on a close entente with England,” the analysis noted, and “a Franco-Soviet military agreement risks putting in jeopardy the warmth and candor of Franco-English relations.” Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 140–1, citing DDF, 2e série, V: 647–8 (May 1, 1937); Bell, France and Britain, 224–5; Adamthwaite, France, 49–50.
71. Jackson, France and the Nazi Menace, 237.
72. Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 140. Litvinov had informed Coulondre that he could do nothing “to suppress the French Communist party,” but that he “did not care in the least what the French government did to them. All that interested Russia was the military alliance with France.” Carley, “Five Kopecks,” 48–9 (citing PRO FO 371 20702, C362O/532/62: note of E. Rowe-Dutton, British embassy, Paris, June 17, 1937, MAE RC, Russie/2057, dos. 3: André-Charles Corbin, French ambassador in London, April 17, 1937); PRO FO 371 20702, C362O/532/62: (Note by R. Vansittart, May 13, 1937), and C3685/532/62: “Extract from a record of conversation at a lunch given by the Secretary of State to M. Delbos & Léger on May 15, 1937”); DVP SSSR, XX: 43–6 (Potyomkin with Chautemps, Jan. 19, 1937), 227–8 (Potyomkin to Surits in Berlin, May 4, 1937).
73. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy, 239. In Jan. 1939, Léon Blum (Daladier’s recent predecessor as prime minister) implored Litvinov for an invitation to Moscow to negotiate directly with Stalin for a “broad antifascist bloc.” Blum also mentioned possibly merging the socialist and communist parties in France. The Soviet politburo formally approved the meeting request, but the trip never happened. Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Evropa, 368 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 24, l. 85); DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 49 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 2, d. 11, l. 39).
74. “Stalin considered vocal music as the finest form of music,” Jelagin thought. Jelagin, Taming of the Arts, 297–9.
75. Jelagin, Taming of the Arts, 268–75; Elagin, Ukroshchenie iskusstv, 302–9. Nazarov would be demoted to deputy chief of the state publishing house on April 1, 1939, and replaced by his deputy Mikhail Khrapchenko (b. 1904).
76. Novikova, “Obruchennyi s bogom,” 427–8. Novikova, a journalist, was only born in 1938, and evidently heard the story from Kozlovsky. Concerning Stalin’s views toward Kozlovsky, see also Gromyko, Pamiatnoe, 203.
77. Ivanov, Aleksei Ivanov, 159; Elagin, Ukroshchenie iskusstv, 332–3.
78. Jelagin, Taming of the Arts, 296–7.
79. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i NKVD, 9 (APRF, f. 3, op. 57, d. 96, l. 110).
80. Petrov and Jansen, Stalinski pitomets, 359–63 (TsA FSB, f. 3–os, op. 6, d. 1, l. 1–6); APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 409, l. 3–9). The commission concluded its work on Jan. 10, 1939; the report was dated Jan. 29.
81. Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 502 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 5086, l. 1–2). In June 1939, Duklesky would insert twenty-six line-item corrections in Vishnevsky’s screenplay for First Cavalry Army—a copy of the document made its way into Stalin’s files (510–2: d. 165, l. 199–201).
