53. Hill, Weizsäcker Papiere, 157, 181.
54. DGFP, series D, VI: 870–1 (July 7), 889 (July 10).
55. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 112–5 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 9157, d. 2, l. 418–31).
56. DBFP, 3rd series, VI: 389–91 (Wilson and Wohltat, July 19, 1939). See Metzmacher, “Deutsch-englische Ausgleichbemühengen.”
57. Gromyko et al., SSSR v bor’be za mir nakanune, 499–502 (July 21, 1939); Schorske, “Two German Diplomats,” 505–6.
58. Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, I: 426–7; Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 208; DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 574n158.
59. Aster, 1939, 243–51. On the parade: Pravda, July 21, 1939.
60. Dirksen, Moscow, Tokyo, London, 242; Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 113.
61. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I: 67–9; Gladwyn, Memoirs, 86–7. Pravda happened to announce on July 22, 1939, the resumption of Soviet-German trade and credit negotiations in Berlin. That same day, the German foreign ministry instructed the embassy in Moscow to try to restart political talks as well. DGFP, series D, VI: 955–6.
62. Overy, “Strategic Intelligence,” 465–6 (citing PRO WO 190/745: “Note on Germany’s Present Position and Future Aims,” Jan. 17, 1939). See also MacDonald, “Economic Appeasement.” On May 23, 1939, Hitler had told his upper military that “it is not Danzig that is at stake. For us it is a matter of expanding our living space in the East and making food supplies secure and also solving the problem of the Baltic States. . . . No other openings can be seen in Europe.” DGFP, series D, VI: 574–80.
63. Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia, 316 (citing Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1108).
64. DBFP, 3rd series, IX: 323 (Halifax to Sir Robert Craigie in Tokyo, July 24, 1939); Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia, 301–10 (citing Halifax Papers, FO 800/315: Henderson to Halifax, June 17, 1939; FO 371/23527/F7395/6457/10: Halifax interview with Maisky, July 25, 1939); Shai, “Was There a Far Eastern Munich?”; Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, 246–71; Watt, How War Came, 356–9.
65. Iklé, German-Japanese Relations, 182; Tokushirō, “The Anti-Comintern Pact,” 107–11. On June 24, 1939, Sorge reported by telegram that he had learned from Ott that the Japanese had allowed that “in the event of a war between Germany and the USSR, Japan will automatically enter into a war against the USSR.” Gromyko et al., SSSR v bor’be za mir nakanune, 463 (June 24, 1939); See also Tokushirō, “The Anti-Comintern Pact,” 9–111.
66. Barnhart, “Japanese Intelligence,” 436–7.
67. Coulondre reported hearsay out of Berlin to Bonnet on July 11, 1939, that Ribbentrop had fallen out of favor with Hitler for failing to anticipate the strong British resistance to Germany’s plans to reclaim Danzig. French Yellow Book, 186–8.
68. Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 294.
69. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 54. On Aug. 10, 1939, Hitler had summoned Carl Burckhardt, the conservative Swiss high commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig, who had been working to avert a British-German war and generally blamed Polish intransigence. “Everything I undertake is aimed at Russia,” Hitler told him at the Berghof the next day, according to Burckhardt. “If the West is too stupid and too blind to see this, I shall be forced to come to an understanding with the Russians, defeat the West, and then marshal my forces against the Soviet Union. I need the Ukraine so that they cannot starve us out, as they did in the last war.” Hitler aimed to neutralize the British and sow distrust between London and Warsaw. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission, 347–8; Levine, “Mediator.” On Sept. 1, 1939, the Nazi Gauleiter in Danzig, Forster, would order Burckhardt out of the “former” free city.
70. As Gaus testified at Nuremberg, “in the early Summer of 1939 . . . von Ribbentrop asked . . . von Weizsäcker and myself to come to his estate, Sonnenburg, near Freienwalde-an-der-Oder, and informed us that Adolf Hitler had for some time been considering an attempt to establish better relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.” This was Ribbentrop talking, not Hitler. Lasky, “Hitler-Stalin Pact,” 9, 15. Ribbentrop would seize upon any reports that Jews were being purged by Stalin to inform Hitler that the Soviet system appeared to be evolving toward a Russian fascism.
71. DGFP, series D, VI: 755–6, 1006–9, 1015–6, 1047–8; Hill, Weizsäcker Papiere, 157 (July 30, 1939); Weinberg, Foreign Policy, II: 604–5; Sipols, Tainy, 79–80.
72. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 33–7.
