73. Henderson, Failure of a Mission, 252–3. Henderson had written to Horace Wilson in May 1939: “The responsibility of my small job in Berlin is greater than my capacity and I cannot feel otherwise than profoundly pessimistic.” Overy, 1939: Countdown, 57 (citing NA, PREM 1/331a).
74. Henderson, Failure of a Mission, 234. See also Cienciala, “German Propaganda.”
75. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 38; DGFP, series D, VI: 1006–9 (July 27, 1939), 1059–62 (Aug. 4); DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 566–9 (AVP RF, f. 0745, op. 14, pap. 32, d. 3, l. 27–30: Aug. 2, 1939); AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1a, p. 26, d. 1, l. 7–12; f. 059, op. 1, pap. 294, d. 2036, l. 162–5, in Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 1. In Aug. 1939, Astakhov was recalled to Moscow; the Germans asked for him to be named ambassador to Berlin. Instead, Astakhov was demoted to a position in the Museum of the Peoples of the USSR. He seems to have died of muscular dystrophy in 1941.
76. DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 585–7 (AVP RF, f. 011, op. 4, pap. 27, d. 61, 126–9: Astakhov to Molotov, Aug. 8, 1939); God krizisa, II: 179–80.
77. DGFP, series D, VI: 1059–62 (Schulenburg to Berlin, Aug. 3–4, just after midnight); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 41.
78. Halder, who looked with trepidation on any pact between Britain and the Soviet Union, was said to have called the prospect “the only thing that could stop Hitler now” in a private conversation. Kordt, Nicht aus Akten, 313–19; Mosley, On Borrowed Time, 252.
79. Voroshilov appeared on nineteen of the twenty-seven days in August for which audiences were recorded in Stalin’s office logbook. For the instructions to Voroshilov (Aug. 4, 1939), see Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/i: 20 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1b, p. 27, d. 5, l. 22–32). Voroshilov would report to Stalin immediately after the conclusion of a session, and Kuznestov writes that on occasion, he and Shaposhnikov attended, too. Kuznetsov appears in the office logbook only on Aug. 20 (without Voroshilov or Shaposhnikov); Shaposhnikov appears on Aug. 13, 14, and 25. There could also have been meetings at the dacha. Na prieme, 268–71; Kuznetsov, Nakanune, 249.
80. Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/i: 19 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1235, l. 66–72). Beria continued to keep Voroshilov well informed of French, German, Italian, British, and other actors through eavesdropped conversations and agent reports, in the European capitals and in Moscow. RGVA, f. 33 987, op. 3, d. 1235, l. 9/cc (Sept. 23, 1939: Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 16).
81. Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, I: 434–5 (Aug. 5, 1939); Pankrashova and Sipols, “Soviet-British-French Talks”; Roberts, Unholy Alliance, 140–1.
82. Primakov, Ocherki, IV: 261–2.
83. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 55.
84. Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia, 310–1.
85. Hill, Weizsäcker Papiere, 157–8. Molotov (July 28) praised Astakhov’s detailed reporting of Schnurre’s proposals and non-response. God krizisa, II: 145 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 295, d. 2038, l. 93); Fleischhauer, Der Pakt, 273–4.
86. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 290.
87. The intense impatience in Berlin was conveyed by Schnurre to Schulenburg in a telegram sent on Aug. 2 and received two days later: “Secret: Politically, the problem of Russia is being dealt with here with extreme urgency. During the last ten days I have daily had at least one direct or telephone conversation with the foreign minister and know that he is also constantly exchanging views with the Führer on this. The foreign minister is concerned to obtain some result on the Russian question as soon as possible, not only on the negative side (disturbing the British negotiations) but also on the positive side (an understanding with us) . . . You can imagine how eagerly talks with Molotov are awaited here.” DGFP, series D, VI: 1047–8.
88. DBFP, 3rd series, VI: 762–89 (“Instructions to the British Military Mission to Moscow, Aug. 1939”); Izvestiia, Aug. 12, 1939; Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, IV: 439.
89. Sipols, Tainy, 89; Pravda, Dec. 24, 1989. Haslam maintained that “given the lack of serious intent in London it was inevitable that the Russians would turn to the Germans.” Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 216.
90. DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 584 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 16, pap. 27, d. 5, l. 38: Aug. 7, 1939); Sluch, “Germano-sovetskie otnosheniia,” 111.
91. Spiridonovka St. became Alexei Tolstoy St.; Litvinov resided on this street when he was people’s commissar for foreign affairs.
