197. Other Brits went even further in the Hitler apologetics than did Chamberlain, at the time and after. A. J. P. Taylor infamously wrote that Hitler “aimed to make Germany the dominant Power in Europe and maybe, more remotely, in the world. Other Powers have pursued similar aims, and still do. . . . In international affairs there was nothing wrong with Hitler except that he was a German.” Taylor, Origins, 293.
198. Kennan in 1935 deemed the idea that Hitler intended to expand into the Soviet Union “the wildest stretch of the imagination.” George Kennan, “The War Problem of the Soviet Union,” in George F. Kennan Papers, Box 1, Mudd Library, Princeton University, in Hochman, Failure of Collective Security, 178. Looking back, Kennan would admit that he misread Hitler and the Nazi threat. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950, 70–3.
199. Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 206–7 (the letter is dated March 26, 1939).
200. Conversely, the British ambassador to Germany had written in his annual report for 1935, a document read by Stalin, that “demanding a guarantee from Hitler vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is equivalent to demanding from the Church obligations to the devil.” Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 234–5 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 2, d. 315, l. 136).
201. Aster, 1939, 281.
202. Roberts, Holy Fox, 157.
203. Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War, 190–1 (von Dirksen memo, Sept. 1939).
204. Overy, “Strategic Intelligence,” 455.
205. Shirer, Berlin Diary, 148.
206. Overy, 1939: Countdown, 11, 34.
207. Below, At Hitler’s Side, 29; Hill, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, 160 (Aug. 25, 1939).
208. Henderson, Failure of a Mission, 259.
209. Documents Concerning German-Polish Relations, 122–3; DBFP, 3rd series, VII: 230, 235, 239; Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, VII: 77 (Aug. 26, 1939); Domarus, Hitler: Reden, III: 1257.
210. Hofer, Die Entstehung des Zwieiten Weltkriegs, 237, 274; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, II: 633–4; Das Deutsche Reich unde der Zweite Weltkrieg, II: 101–2.
211. Hartmann, Halder, 137.
212. Engelmann, In Hitler’s Germany, 150. Not all German units received the new order to stand down, which meant fighting erupted in a few places, notably in the Jablonka Pass on the Slovak-Polish border.
213. I documenti diplomatici Italiani, 8th ser., 13 vols. (Rome: Libreria dello Sstato, 1952–), XIII: 164–5. DGFP, series D, VII: 285–6 (Mussolini to Hitler, Aug. 25, 1939); Hill, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, 160–1 (Aug. 25, 1939); Gibson, Ciano Diaries, 128–9 (Aug. 25, 1939); Ciano, Diary, 264–5.
214. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 215. Italy had already informed Germany, in general terms, on May 31, 1939, that it would not be ready for war before 1943. In June 1939, Chamberlain told the committee of imperial defence that “the Italians would be on the lookout for any excuse to keep out of the war.” DGFP, series D, VI: 617–20; Overy, “Strategic Intelligence,” 470 (citing PRO CAB 2/8: Minutes of CID meeting, June 22, 1939, 6).
215. Overy, 1939: Countdown, 36 (citing NA, PREM 1/331a: Strang to Cadogan, Aug. 26, 1939, 1; Halifax Papers, A4.4103/10 (i): Birger Dahlerus, 11; and Le Livre jaune francais: documents diplmatiques 1938–1939 [Paris, 1939]), 312 (Coulondre to Bonnet, Aug. 25, 1939).
216. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 215; Hofer, Die Entstehung des Zwieiten Weltkriegs, 276.
217. Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 60 (Aug. 27 and 29, 1939).
218. Cienciala, “Poland in British and French Policy,” 215–6; DGFP, series D, VII: 405–7 (Ribbentrop to Bernardo Attolico, Aug. 29, 1939). Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador to London, reported that Chamberlain was concerned that the Poles be “reasonable” vis-à-vis Hitler’s demands. FRUS, 1939, I: 392 (Kennedy telegram, Aug. 30, 1939).
219. De Felice, Mussolini, II: 670.
220. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 581 (German account); Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 12. Ribbentrop had first told Stalin of the joke making the rounds in Berlin that “Stalin will join the Anti-Comintern Pact.” Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 75.
221. Hillgruber, Die Zerstörung Europas, 212. The expression to play “va banque” (translated here as “go for broke”), from baccarat, connotes wagering an amount equal to that held by the banker of the game.
