Stalin полностью

317. Pravda, Sept. 29, 1939. For the text and secret protocol, see: DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 134–5 (AVP RF, f. 3a Germaniia, d. 246), 135–6 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675a, l. 20). Facsimiles of the document in German and Russian can be found in Hass, 23 August 1939, 246–51; facsimiles of the maps, with Stalin’s signature, can be found in Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 98–9. See also Izvestiia, Sept. 29, 1939.

318. Golovanov, “1,367 dnei iz zhizni Andreia Tupoleva.”

319. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 90, 92.

320. Supposedly, Stalin, good-cop style, puffing his pipe, took to appearing from behind a curtain in Mikoyan’s office and offering “compromises” to the Germans.

321. The regime’s notetaker, Vyacheslav Malyshev, paid tribute to the effectiveness of the faux-populism, recording that “this was a characteristic trait of Stalin’s: to drill down to the smallest details, especially when those small details affected people.” Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 109; Na prieme, 275. This appears to have been a secret (non-published) decree. No such decree appears in late 1939 or 1940 in the account offered by Barber and Harrison, Soviet Home Front, chapter 9.

322. The “affinity thesis”—despite the profound ideological enmity—was subsequently re-presented by Tucker and Nekrich. Tucker, Stalin in Power; Nekrich, Pariahs.

323. More than four of every five Nazi Party members were male. A National Socialist Women’s League counted approximately 2 million members; it offered classes for schoolgirls and brides and promoted consumption of German-made products. Payne, History of Fascism, 184.

324. Rigby, Communist Party Membership, 52. Communist Youth League membership, for those from age fourteen (to maximum twenty-eight), shrank to just 400,000 in 1938. Hitler Youth membership, which was compulsory from age fourteen for Aryans and closed to others, exceeded 7 million by then.

325. The best overview remains Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, II.

326. To be sure, German state demand for goods and services had gone through the roof since 1932, as the state share of GDP more than doubled to 30.5 percent. The state also influenced foreign exchange, set some wages, and froze some prices, but it only rarely nationalized property. Jewish property was confiscated by forced sale, but usually to Aryan private owners. Buchheim and Scherner, “Role of Private Property.”

327. Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 111 (May 26, 1940).

328. Herwarth would tell U.S. ambassador Charles Bohlen after WWII that “We were able to make a deal with the Soviets because we were able without any problems with German opinion to deliver the Baltic states and eastern Poland to Russia. This the British and the French, with their public opinions, were unable to do.” Bohlen, Witness to History, 86.

329. Weinberg, “Nazi-Soviet Pacts,” 185 (citing PRO, FO 371/24846, f. 10, N 6526/30/38, Cripps to the Foreign Office, July 16, 1940). For the mostly matching Soviet transcript: “Priem angliiskogo posla S. Krippsa,” in Sochineniia, XVIII: 190–7 (at 191). Versailles revision was something Chamberlain, too, pursued in his own way, albeit only with regard to Germany—not the Soviet Union.

330. XVIII s”ezd VKP (b), 27.

331. Nevile Henderson, in an unintentional self-indictment, would correctly note that “though Hitler was constantly talking of the hand which he had held out to England and complaining that England had rejected it, whenever definite advances were made to him, he always found some way of withdrawing and of refusing to meet us half-way.” Henderson, Failure of a Mission, 110.

332. Bullock wrote that from “1934 through 1939 Hitler’s priorities were the reverse of Stalin’s: foreign policy and rearmament, not domestic issues. If Stalin had to pay increasing attention to foreign policy and defense in 1938 and 1939, it was not because of expansionist ambitions of his own but because Hitler’s successes threatened the security of Stalin’s achievement within the Soviet Union.” This misses Stalin’s opportunism and intense resentment at British power. Bullock, Hitler and Stalin (New York: Knopf, 1991), 639.

333. Hitler had told his military commanders on May 23, 1939, “for us it is a matter of expanding our Lebensraum in the East and of making food supplies secure,” not merely the city of Danzig. Overy, 1939: Countdown, 2 (citing ADAP, VI: 479).

334. “I am certain that even if the Germans were given more than they ask for they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by the demon of destruction,” Ciano recorded in his diary after meetings with Ribbentrop and Hitler on Aug. 11–12. Ciano, Diary, 118–20 (Aug. 11–13, 1939).