32. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 177. Voroshilov visited the Karelian Isthmus sometime in April and ordered that combat readiness be raised and plans be developed for evacuation of women and children should war break out. Semiriaga, Tainy stalinskoi diplomatii, 146 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 4, d. 366, l. 134). Also in April 1939, the NKVD transport directorate produced an internal assessment of all the ports and military bases of all countries on or near the Baltic Sea. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 250.
33. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 177–80. Meretskov (Na sluzhbe, 178) claims that he was present during a conversation between Kuusinen and Stalin in late June 1939, and that Stalin expressed alarm over the situation with Finland. Neither appears in the logbooks for summer 1939. Na prieme, 646, 661. In summer 1939, the Finnish-Soviet border was largely quiet. Chugunov, Granitsa nakanune voiny, 10.
34. Fel’shtinskii, SSSR-Germaniia, II: 17 (Oct. 10, 1939).
35. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 85–112 (Leningrad-province state security, July 13, 1939); Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 150–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 405, l. 200: Beria, no earlier than July 10, 1939).
36. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 7 (citing PRO FO 371 23648, N3199). The British general might have been trying to induce London to help the Finns.
37. Development of Finnish-Soviet Relations, 42; Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 229. On Latvia, see Dr. Alfred B ī lmanis: Latvian Russian Relations, 192–8; Polpredy soobshchaiut, 75–86 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 12, d. 119a, l. 3–8, 9–17); Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 184; Izvestiia, Oct. 6, 1939.
38. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 201–3; Manninen and Baryshnikov, “Peregovory osen’iu 1939 goda,” I: 116–7.
39. Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/i (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1235, l. 99); Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 160–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 30, l. 225–6). On the formulation of Soviet demands, see Manninen and Baryshnikov, “Peregovory osen’iu 1939 goda,” I: 119–21.
40. Raskol’nikov, “Otkrytoe pis’mo Stalinu” (Aug. 17, 1939). He died Sept. 12. See also Artizov et al., Reabilitatsiia: kak eto bylo, II: 420–53; and Magerovsky, “The People’s Commissariat,” II: 342–3. Speculation on the cause of Raskolnikov’s death—poisoning, nervous breakdown—is inconclusive. Konstantinov, F. F. Ilin-Raskol’nikov, 153; “Smert’ Raskol’nikov,” Vorozhdenie, September, 29, 1939; Barmine, One Who Survived, 21; Ehrenburg, Memoirs, 469. Raskolnikov evidently did lose his mind. N. P. V., “Sumashestvie Raskol’nikova: beseda s A.G. Barminym,” Poslednie novosti, Aug. 28, 1939; I. M., “Raskol’nikov soshel s uma,” Vorozhdenie, Sept. 1, 1939.
41. Raskolnikov added: “He does not like people who have their own opinion, and with his usual nastiness drives them away.” Medvedev, Let History Judge, 592.
42. Gerrard, Foreign Office and Finland, 88–9 (quoting Lascelles’s and Lawrence Collier’s minutes on a report from Helsinki, Oct. 8, 1939). For the argument about Finland being a pawn in British strategy, see Pritt, Must the War Spread? (Pritt was expelled from the Labour Party, partly as a result of his pro-Soviet views in the Soviet-Finnish War.) On Britain’s possible lack of inside information concerning the Helsinki government, see Sotskov, Pribaltika i geopolitika, 64–5 (Oct. 16, 1939).
43. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 167–9 (Maisky, Oct. 7, 1939); Maisky, Dnevnik diplomata, II/i: 28–31 (Oct. 6, 1939); Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 232. Churchill continued this line in further discussions with Maisky: DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 2 (Nov. 13, 1939). See also Gerrard, Foreign Office and Finland, 95 (citing FO 371/23683/N6384: British War cabinet, Nov. 16, 1939). Back in the Russian civil war, the lengthy Helsinki-London plotting had come to naught, opposed by the British cabinet, the Finnish parliament, and newly independent border states wary of collaboration with the Russian nationalist Whites. Ruotsila, “Churchill-Mannerheim Collaboration.”
44. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 196 (RGVA, f. 25888, op. 11, d. 76, l. 12). Mobilization was complete by a second report, on Oct. 13 (199: l. 16).
45. Izvestiia, Oct. 11, 1939; SSSR i Litva, I: 205–46; Polpredy soobshchaiut, 94–144; Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 193.