46. Zonin, Admiral L. M. Galler, 309.
47. DPV SSSR, XXII/ii: 178 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 297, d. 2053, l. 197).
48. Stalin had received Molotov and Derevyansky that afternoon, just prior to meeting the Finns: Na prieme, 276.
49. Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 35 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 193, l. 4); Tanner, Winter War, 25 (who claims his account of Stalin’s presentation is based on the Finnish interpreter’s notes). Paasikivi had been born Johan Gustaf Hellsten and Finnicized his name at age fifteen, in 1885, after he had been orphaned.
50. The Beria report was dated Oct. 12, 1939. Vrang had become a celebrity in Moscow diplomatic circles as a result of the circumstance that in a Soviet espionage film, the actor who played the role of the main bad guy, a foreign military attaché, happened to be a dead ringer for the Swede. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1091, citing U. A. Käkönen, Sotilasasiamiehenä Moskovassa 1939 (Helsinki, 1966), 62; Norberg, “Det militära hotet.”
51. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 162–3 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 393, l. 122–4: Oct. 12, 1939), 163–4 (op. 6, d. 31, l. 117–9, Oct. 12), 164–5 (d. 31, l. 122–4: Oct. 13), 165–6 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 393, l. 122–4), 166–7 (l. 147–9: Oct. 14, 1939); Volkogonov Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, box 1. See also Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1091–2. One clandestine Soviet source in Helsinki, Cay Sundström, a pro-Communist Social Democrat in the Finnish parliament (his NKVD code name was “the Count”), complained to the NKVD that when the parliamentary foreign-affairs committee discussed Soviet demands in his presence, other members told the rapporteur to stop speaking. He informed Moscow that Erkko had stated there was no need for any concessions to the Soviet Union because Finland could count on the support of Britain, the United States, and Sweden. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions”; Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 163–4 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 31, l. 117-9: Oct. 12); Volkogonov Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, box 1 (identifying the source as Sundström); Sinitsyn, Rezident svidel’stvuet, 21. See also Manninen and Baryshnikov, “Peregovory osen’iu 1939 goda,” 119.
52. Stalin received Molotov for fifteen minutes prior to meeting the Finns: Na prieme, 276.
53. Erickson, Soviet High Command, 474.
54. Upton, Finland, 29–30 (quoting J. K. Paasikivi, Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939–1941 [Porvoo: Werner Söderström, 1959], I: 45–6); Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 114–8; Tanner, Winter War, 27–8; Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 35 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 193, l. 1–2). Apparently, the Soviet side made no formal record of the talks: Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 237–8.
55. Stalin also suspected that a coup could bring an avowedly fascist regime to power in Helsinki. The NKVD in Leningrad characterized the Cayander-Tanner government in Helsinki as proto-fascist. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 85–112 (July 13, 1939).
56. Tanner, Winter War, 30.
57. A Soviet military intelligence on Finnish civilian evacuations from frontline areas was dated Oct. 14, 1939; the evacuations would be pronounced complete seven days later. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 199–200 (RGVA, f. 25888, op. 11, d. 76, l. 17), 200 (l. 20).
58. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 120.
59. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 170–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 31, l. 282–4: Oct. 19, 1939).
60. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 169–70 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 31, l. 216–8: Beria, Oct. 17, 1939), 170–1 (l. 282-4: Oct. 19); Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1093. See also Voskresenskaia, Pod psevdonym Irina, 112–8. On German policy toward Finland, see Jonas, Wipert von Blücher, 105–58. Stalin prohibited engaging ethnic Finns in espionage work, reminding Proskurov (head of Soviet military intelligence) that a radio operator working for them in Mongolia (under the name of Voroshilov, no less) had been exposed as a Finn. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i NKVD, 123 (Aug. 25, 1939).
61. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 172–3 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 31, l. 341–3: from Colonel Doi).
62. Stalin’s ultimate aims are not spelled out in internal Soviet documents. We are left, like the Finns, to deduce his aims from his statements in the negotiations, and, above all, from his actions.
63. Rentola, “Finnish Communists and the Winter War,” 596.
64. Upton, Finland, 35.
