102. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1094, citing V. Vladimirov, Kohti talvisotaa (Helsinki, 1995), 163–4; Rentola, “Finnish Communists and the Winter War,” 598n27; Kolpakidi, Entsiklopediia sekretnykh sluzhb Rossii, 711–2. Unexpectedly, a report by the general staff for the Leningrad military district (Nov. 10, 1939) praised Finnish military training and judged “the morale of the Finnish army, despite the class difference between the officers and soldiers,” as “sufficiently steadfast.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 205–7 (RGVA, f. 25888, op. 11, d. 17, l. 194–200). Stalin finally posted a new military intelligence officer to Helsinki, Colonel Ivan Smirnov, who replaced the man executed in the terror. Sinitsyn, in his posthumously published memoir, would claim he had conveyed the opposite of what he had actually reported.
103. They took along Nikolai Voronov, the artillery specialist. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 134; Na prieme, 279–80. The Main Military Council in Moscow, with Stalin in attendance (Nov. 21), approved a plan for an expansion to a peacetime army of 2.3 million. Glavnyi voennyi sovet RKKA, 269–86 (RGVA, f. 4, op. 18, d. 49, l. 1–26), 440–53 (RGVA, f. 40442, op. 2, d. 128, l. 120–39: Smorodinov and Gusev).
104. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 140.
105. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1090.
106. Meretskov reported to Stalin that the deadly attack had originated from the Finnish side. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 182; Dvoynikh and Eliseeva, Konflikt, doc. 8 (RGVA. F. 33987, op. 3, d. 1240, l. 115).
107. Manninen, “Vystreli byli” (citing the recollections of a Soviet officer who took part). See also Zhdanov’s cryptic but suggestive notes: Baryshnikov and Manninen, “V kanun zimnei voiny,” I: 137 (RGASPI, f. 77, op. 3, d. 163, l. 3120). Khrushchev recalled that “Kuusinen and I . . . found out when we were at Stalin’s apartment that the first shots had been fired from our side. There’s no getting around that fact.” Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 254.
108. Na prieme, 282; Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 200–3.
109. Balashov, Prinimai nas, 23; Pravda, Nov. 29, 1939.
110. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1096 (citing KrA, FST/Und E II: 15); Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 37 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 188, l. 22–3, 26).
111. Dvoynikh and Eliseeva, Konflikt, doc. 16 (RGVA, f. 34980, op. 1, d. 794, l. 1). See also Azarov, Osazhdennaia Odessa, 5.
112. Vehviläinen, “Trudnaia doroga k miru,” I: 228. See also Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 142.
113. For a top-secret Finnish intelligence assessment (Nov. 25, 1939) translated into Russian, see Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 195–200.
114. Upton, Finland, 50 (citing J. K. Paasikivi, Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939–1941 [Porvoo: Werner Söderström, 1959], I: 116); Development of Finnish-Soviet Relations, 72–3; Baryshnikov and Manninen, “V kanun zimnei voiny,” 135 (citing Finnish officials).
115. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 227–9 (GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 528, l. 228–30: Dec. 1, 1939).
116. Na prieme, 279. On Stalin’ s corrections of Kuusinen dating back to Aug. 1928, see Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Komintern, 545–6 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 755, l. 116–7); RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 755, l. 164.
117. Tuominen judged Stalin’s humor offbeat (mostly from stories he heard from Kuusinen, with whom he had shared a flat in the House on the Embankment). Tuominen, Bells of the Kremlin, 158, 166, 173.
118. A few days after Tuominen’s initial summons by Kuusinen, the Soviet embassy in Stockholm followed up; again he refused. On Nov. 21, he claimed, he received a third order, this one delivered by a courier; Tuominen still refused. He also claimed that he decided not to inform the Finnish regime in Helsinki of the sensational news of a pending Soviet attack. Tuominen, Bells of the Kremlin, 315–8; Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 147. After seeing the Finnish resistance, Tuominen would issue feelers to Finland’s Social Democrats and publicly break with Moscow in spring 1940.
119. Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 38 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 192). More broadly, see Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second Word War, 30–73; and Kirby, Concise History of Finland, 197–216.
120. Pravda, Dec. 1, 1939.
