212. It is said that Stalin disliked The Great Dictator. In any case, it was never released in the USSR. Konchalovsky, Inner Circle, 27.
213. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 674–6 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 341, l. 80–4: Vyshinsky); Dilks, Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 331 (brackets).
214. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 677–9 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 3, d. 17, l. 50–5).
215. DGFP, series D, XI: 291–7; Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 148 (Oct. 15, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 622–6; Fabry, Der Hitler-Stalin Pakt, 343–5.
216. DGFP, series D, XI: 291–7 (Ribbentrop to Stalin, Oct. 13, 1940); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 207–16; Naumov, 1941 god, I: 302–5 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 157, l. 47–51), 305–10 (Russian version, APRF, f. 45, op. 1., d. 296, l. 9–20), 317–8 (Stalin’s reply, APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 1); “‘Ia pochtu za udovol’stvie vnov’ priekhat’ v Moskvu’: obmen poslaniiami mezhdu I. Ribbentropom i I. V. Staliym v oktiabre 1940 g.” 21), 141–5 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 296, l. 31–3: Ribbentrop, Oct. 21); DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 680–2 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 1576, l. 47–51: Schulenburg-Molotov conversation); Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III: 474–5; Hilger and Mayer, Incompatible Allies, 321; Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor, 120.
217. DGFP, series D, XI: 508–10. Ribbentrop later quoted Hitler to the effect that “Ribbentrop, we have achieved many things together; perhaps we shall also pull this one off together.” Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 151.
218. Santa Olalla, at Himmler’s invitation, would lay plans for joint study of Visigoth tombs in Spain. Treglown, Franco’s Crypt, 246–7.
219. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 41. See also Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 124 (Aug. 3, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 538.
220. Preston, Franco, 392–400; DGFP, series D, IX: 311. The account of Hendaye by Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, is fraudulent: Schmidt was not there. Pike, “Franco and the Axis Stigma,” 377–9.
221. The Germans were put off by the Guardists’ indiscipline. Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 59–63. Germany had inserted economic (not military) advisers into the Romanian state in spring 1939.
222. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 154 (Oct. 29, 1940), 158 (Nov. 1, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 641–2, 669–71; Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, II: 32–6; Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 185–8, 193–9; van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 47 (citing German Foreign Ministry 1247/337515: H. von Etzdorf note, Oct. 28); Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 131–41; Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 199.
223. Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 137 (citing Ciano).
224. Schmidt, Statist, 516–7.
225. Schramm, Kriegstagebuch der Oberkommando, I: 148–9 (Nov. 1, 1940), 150–1 (Nov. 4, 1941), 152, 157, 158 (Nov. 7, 1940), 160 (Nov. 8, 1940), 182 (Nov. 19, 1940); Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War Directives, 39–43.
226. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 163–4 (Nov. 4, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 672–5.
227. Seidl, Die Beziehungen, 239 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Oct. 19, 1940), 243 (Schulenburg to Dörnberg, Oct. 30), 243–4 (Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Oct. 31), 244–5 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Nov. 1).
228. Rossi, Deux ans, 173n3; Rossi [Tasca], Russo-German Alliance, 163.
229. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 62–5. Germany had become the number-one trading partner with southeastern Europe, accounting for between 30 and 60 percent of each country’s trade, paying above world market prices for agricultural goods, preferring the stable, long-term market access, which also did not require hard currency (they used clearing accounts). The Yugoslav and Romanian prime ministers understood this dependence on German markets, and refused to listen to French or British political pitches. Despite their racial condescension, the Germans did not view the Balkans through a Lebensraum prism. Gross, Export Empire. On Oct. 25, 1940, NKVD transport secretly reported the construction of border fortifications and a concentration of pontoon bridges on the frontier with Ukraine. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 324–6.
