316. DGFP, series D, XI: 606–10 (Nov. 19, 1940), 63–43 (Nov. 20). Ciano would observe that “I will immediately state that after Molotov’s visit we speak very little of Russia, and in a somewhat different tone than that used by Ribbentrop during my recent visit. . . . Russia is once again a country not to be trusted.” Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 213n74 (citing Ciano, L’Europa verso la catastrofe, 616).
317. Schramm, Kriegstagebuch der Oberkommando, I: 179.
318. DGFP, series D, XI: 632–6 (Nov. 26, 1940).
319. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 82. Martin Bormann would later state that, in Feb. 1945, Hitler had told him, “my decision was made immediately after the departure of Molotov . . . I decided . . . to settle accounts with the Russians.” Trevor-Roper, Le Testament politique de Hitler, 95–6.
320. The Soviet Union’s modern technology was highly concentrated in just a few sectors. The railways remained steam-powered, not incorporating electricity on a mass scale, and the construction industry still used bricks and timber, not reinforced concrete. Above all, Soviet factories had far more workers, and lower productivity per worker, than their American or German prototypes, suffering from gigantomania and the lack of legal market mechanisms. The Soviets failed to exercise their option to purchase the Ford Co.’s V-8 engine, and Soviet trucks (the GAZ model) remained relatively primitive. Lewis, “Technology and the Transformation of the Soviet Economy,” 190. The number of women working outside the home between 1928 and 1940 increased from 2.8 million to 13.2 million and constituted 39 percent of the labor force in 1940. Drobizhev, Industrializatsiia i izmeneniia, 4–5. Nearly 20 million peasants had relocated to towns and industrial construction sites over the past decade.
321. Ganson, “Food Supply, Rationing and Living Standards,” 70.
322. Nekrich, Pariahs, 203; Weinberg, World at Arms, 201. Stalin again was privy to the German strategy in bilateral economic negotiations, thanks to Gerhard Kegel (“X”). Naumov, 1941 god, I: 334–9 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 437, l. 1–12: Nov. 2, 1940).
323. Iakovlev, Tsel’ zhizni (6th ed.), 179, 188; Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 75–106. See also Sobolev and Khazanov, Nemetskii sled. Goring had again interceded to get Krupp to treat contracts with the Soviet Union as equivalent to those with the German military and to accelerate a Soviet deal for six battleship turrets and 38-cm guns, giving the impression that the overall bilateral relationship could be salvaged. Von Strandmann, “Appeasement and Counter-Appeasement,” 168–9 (citing HA Krupp, WA 40, B 381, October 4, 1940; WA 4, 2925, Oct. 8, 1940, Nov. 31, 1940).
324. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 374–5 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, p. 339, d. 2315, l. 35, 35 a, 36, 38, 39).
325. This was a far cry from Ribbentrop’s statement in the Pact negotiations that Germany was “politically disinterested” in southeastern Europe. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 155–63. See also Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 298–9. It must be said that by 1940, some in the Nazi regime feared that the Soviets could not be contained in the role of junior partner because of their leverage in being the key repository of raw materials. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 20–14.
326. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 252–4; DGFP, series D, XI: 562–70. Hitler appears not to have informed Ribbentrop about his intentions at this point. Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 151–2; Waddington, “Ribbentrop and the Soviet Union,” 25–6.
327. “Two things became clear in the discussions: Hitler’s intention to push the Soviet Union in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and his unwillingness to acknowledge any Soviet interest in Europe.” Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 324.
328. Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher, XXXIV: 469 (Hitler. Jan. 20, 1941); Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 343. In 1940, Greater Germany produced only a quarter of the oil it consumed. By mid-1941, Germany’s oil resources would total 10 million tons; of these, 500,000 were produced by Germany proper, 800,000 by countries occupied by Germany, and 8.7 million tons by Germany’s allies, primarily Romania.
