13. “Nakanune voiny (1940–1941 gg.),” 219; Gavrilov,
14. “A large portrait of Marx hung in the office, and in a glass case there was a bust of Lenin,” recalled Mgeladze. “The simplicity and modesty caught one’s eye, and, looking around, we could not help but think that the offices of some commissars in the republic had more lavish appointments.” Stalin stood next to the long felt-covered table smoking a cigarette, which surprised Mgeladze (all the portraits had him with a pipe). In front of Stalin sat a glass of tea and a lemon, which during the discussion he squeezed into his tea. Mgeladze recalled the meeting as taking place in Jan. He also remembered the presence of Molotov, Beria, and Voznesensky, all of whom appear in the logbook for the one day that Mgeladze appears (Dec. 23, 1940). Mgeladze,
15. Shakhurin,
16. Mearsheimer,
17. The 1939 field service regulations had stated: “The Red Army will be the most offensive-minded of all the attacking armies that ever existed.” Stalin had told a Central Committee plenum on Jan. 19, 1925: “Our banner remains the banner of peace. But if war breaks out, we will not be able to sit with folded arms—we will have to take action, but we will be the last to do so. And we will do so in order to throw the decisive weight into the scales.” Meltiukhov, almost alone, correctly has the arrows moving west on maps illustrating Soviet war plans. Mel’tiukov,
18. One Soviet agent reported that France had expected a number of tactical engagements with Germany, not a surprise knockout blow with massed German forces, and that France compounded this error by forward deployment at the Belgian-German border, rendering those units unable to respond quickly to German flanking maneuvers. Roberts, “Planning for War” (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1302, l. 180, 185–6); RGVA, f. 33988. op. 4, d. 35, 1. 287–292: June 3, 1940; Simonov, “Zametki k biografii G. K Zhukova,” 53; Zhukov,
19. On May 14, 1938, Yezhov sent Stalin a report laying out an analysis by the incarcerated Vasily Lavrov, who noted that in early 1937, during war games, Tukhachevsky, playing the southern attack variant of the blues (Germany, Poland, Finland, and Balts) on the Lvov-Donetsk axis, had proven that the Germans could deliver a deadly strike against Soviet military industry. The precondition for this outcome was a German occupation of Czechoslovakia (with its military industry) as well as of Romania (with its oil and food). Lavrov put together charts and maps showing the extent of the possible catastrophe. On July 29, 1938, he was executed. Khaustov and Samuelson,
20. Verkhovskii,
21. Tukhachevskii, “O strategicheskikh vzglyadakh Prof. Svechina,” 3–16.