13. “Nakanune voiny (1940–1941 gg.),” 219; Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 498–9 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22424, d. 4, l. 537); Naumov, 1941 god, I: 466; Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 451 (facsimile). Scholars have access only to what Soviet intelligence archives themselves have published. Frederick Barbarossa, who led the third crusade through Asia Minor, drowned on June 10, 1190, a failure. His corpse was never found.

14. “A large portrait of Marx hung in the office, and in a glass case there was a bust of Lenin,” recalled Mgeladze. “The simplicity and modesty caught one’s eye, and, looking around, we could not help but think that the offices of some commissars in the republic had more lavish appointments.” Stalin stood next to the long felt-covered table smoking a cigarette, which surprised Mgeladze (all the portraits had him with a pipe). In front of Stalin sat a glass of tea and a lemon, which during the discussion he squeezed into his tea. Mgeladze recalled the meeting as taking place in Jan. He also remembered the presence of Molotov, Beria, and Voznesensky, all of whom appear in the logbook for the one day that Mgeladze appears (Dec. 23, 1940). Mgeladze, Stalin, kaki a ego znal, 25–9; Na prieme, 321.

15. Shakhurin, Krylia pobedy, 186–7; Na prieme, 321. See also Patolichev, Vospominaniia, 105–7.

16. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 46–52.

17. The 1939 field service regulations had stated: “The Red Army will be the most offensive-minded of all the attacking armies that ever existed.” Stalin had told a Central Committee plenum on Jan. 19, 1925: “Our banner remains the banner of peace. But if war breaks out, we will not be able to sit with folded arms—we will have to take action, but we will be the last to do so. And we will do so in order to throw the decisive weight into the scales.” Meltiukhov, almost alone, correctly has the arrows moving west on maps illustrating Soviet war plans. Mel’tiukov, Upushchennyi shans, 256–7.

18. One Soviet agent reported that France had expected a number of tactical engagements with Germany, not a surprise knockout blow with massed German forces, and that France compounded this error by forward deployment at the Belgian-German border, rendering those units unable to respond quickly to German flanking maneuvers. Roberts, “Planning for War” (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1302, l. 180, 185–6); RGVA, f. 33988. op. 4, d. 35, 1. 287–292: June 3, 1940; Simonov, “Zametki k biografii G. K Zhukova,” 53; Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 324. A book published in early 1940 argued that the German experience in Poland had reconfirmed that the only way to defend against a surprise attack by secretly massed, highly mobile mechanized forces was to preempt the enemy by achieving one’s strategic deployment first. Krasil’nikov, “Nastupatel’naia armeiskaia operatsiya,” 487–96.

19. On May 14, 1938, Yezhov sent Stalin a report laying out an analysis by the incarcerated Vasily Lavrov, who noted that in early 1937, during war games, Tukhachevsky, playing the southern attack variant of the blues (Germany, Poland, Finland, and Balts) on the Lvov-Donetsk axis, had proven that the Germans could deliver a deadly strike against Soviet military industry. The precondition for this outcome was a German occupation of Czechoslovakia (with its military industry) as well as of Romania (with its oil and food). Lavrov put together charts and maps showing the extent of the possible catastrophe. On July 29, 1938, he was executed. Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 205 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 5, d. 343, l. 28–48); Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 378. In Dec. 1937, when Stalin received “testimony” from Lavrov implicating Lieutenant General Yakov Smushkevich, the aide for aviation to the chief of the general staff, the despot wrote on it, “He lies, the swine,” a rare instance in which he appears to have rejected an interrogation protocol. Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 208 (APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 329, l. 59). See also the call by General Jan Strumis, known as Zhigur, in a denunciation of Alexander Yegorov (July 20, 1937), for reexamination of all war plans to take account of recent war games. He was arrested in Dec. and executed on July 22, 1938. RGVA, f. 33987, f. 3, op. 10, d. 1046, l. 209–29; Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, 188; Zakharov, General’nyi shtab, 125–33.

20. Verkhovskii, Ogon’, manevr, i maskirovka, 131.

21. Tukhachevskii, “O strategicheskikh vzglyadakh Prof. Svechina,” 3–16.

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