329. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 332. Jold evidently told Wehrmacht High Command planners on Dec. 5, 1940, following a “Führer Conference”: “The Führer is determined to carry through this operation in the East since the Army will never again be as strong as it is at this moment and Soviet Russia has recently given one more proof that she will always, whenever possible, stand in Germany’s path.” Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 137.
330. Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 152.
331. Trial of the Major War Criminals, X: 291, 314–5 (Ribbentrop).
332. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 80–1.
333. Nekrich, Pariahs, 229–30 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 913, l. 62, 65–6, l. 119). See also Nekrich, “Dynamism of the Past,” 232–3.
334. Mueller-Hildebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia Germanii, 596 (Nov. 15, 1940). Reports of heavy German troop concentrations in Romania as of Nov. 1940 turned out to be fictitious, possibly part of a disinformation campaign. The actual stationing order was issued only on Dec. 13, 1940. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 492–4 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 9181, d. 6, l. 17–9).
335. Trial of the Major War Criminals, VII: 254 (Paulus); Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 137. Between May 1939 and Dec. 1940, Soviet military intelligence received more than two dozen warnings from its agents of German invasion planning; during the same period, military intelligence prepared more than one dozen summaries for the top brass and political leadership (Stalin and Molotov). Lota, Sekretnyi front, 129.
336. Gor’kov, Kreml’, 30–5.
337. Similarly, electricity consumption in 1932 badly missed its target—13.4 instead of 22 billion kilowatt-hours—but by 1940 was reported at 48.6 billion. Coal extraction, which had been 35. 4 million tons in 1927–28, rose to a reported 140.5 million in 1940. Nove, Economic History of the USSR (1989), 183, 217; Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 70 let, 161, 163–4; Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 108–9.
338. Mass production of the famed T-34 began in June 1940, but that year the Soviet Union managed to turn out just 115 T-34s, as well as 243 KV tanks.
339. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 137 (Nov. 25, 1940).
340. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/I: 286–96 (TsA FSK). See also Simonov, Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR, 100; Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 335. Conscripts’ food was irregular, and bathing and laundry infrequent, to put it mildly; housing was the sorest point of all.
341. Staff who had been gathering the statistics went to prison or into unmarked graves. Katz, “Purges and Production.” See also Khlevniuk, “Economic Officials in the Great Terror,” 38–67. Problems in the Great War, such as severe shortages of artillery shells that had undermined the tsarist war effort, were common knowledge in Stalin’s time. Manikovskii, Boevoe snabzhenie russkoi armii, 111; Barsukov, Russkaia artilleriia, 161.
342. Sokolov, Ot voenproma k VPK, 361–78.
343. In 1940, military outlays represented more than the entire 1934 state budget. Plotnikov, Ocherki istorii biudzheta Sovetskogo gosudarstva, 260–1. The Soviet Union had 218 military factories when the defense industry commissariat was established in 1939 (versus 45 in the late 1920s). Harrison and Davies, “Soviet Military-Economic Effort,” 372, 377 (citing RGAE, f. 2097, op. 1, d. 1051, l. 17–8: Nov. 15, 1929); Simonov, Voennyo-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR, 38–41. See also Werner, Military Strength of the Powers. The Soviets had also built in extra capacity for rapid switch in wartime. Davies and Harrison, “Defence Spending,” 90; Harrison, Accounting for War, 110. An earlier scholar calculated the peacetime share of Soviet military spending as 2 percent in 1928, 6 percent in 1937, and 15 percent in 1940. Bergson, Real National Income, 46; Gregory, Russian National Income, 57.
344. Bruce Menning, private communication. See Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 160 (TsA FSB, ASD P-4574, t. 1, l. 53).
345. Abelshauser, “Germany,” 138.
