30. Golikov circulated this message to List no. 1. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 527 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 3, l. 6–7); Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 449–50 (facsimile). In early 1941, the NKVD, military intelligence, and naval intelligence were ordered to submit their reports to the ambassador, who would coordinate them and inhibit rivalries. Neither the coordination nor the tamping down of rivalries happened.
31. SD chief of counterintelligence Schellenberger was not officially informed of Barbarossa until late Jan. 1941. Senior German field commanders would only be told that the deployments were a precaution against Soviet massing of forces. Both the high command and the foreign ministry would issue documents with false information. Hitler would oversee three major war conferences between Jan. and March 1941, the first two in Berchtesgaden, the third in Berlin. Warlimont, who had had a hand in drawing up Barbarossa, claims that on Jan. 18, at the Berchtesgaden, he had to ask General Jodl, the principal military adviser in Hitler’s entourage, whether Barbarossa was even still on. Jodl replied affirmatively, adding, “The Russian colossus will prove to be a pig’s bladder; prick it and it will burst.” Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 140. See also Whaley, Codeword, 133. By the March 30 conference, 250 commanders were in the know. The Wehrmacht had 320,000 officers, including at least 3,000 generals.
32. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 275–6; Lota, Sekretnyi front, 42. Tupikov arrived in Berlin on Jan. 8. His appointment reflected the recent report out of Berlin on Dec. 29 (and its follow-up on Jan. 4) about a supersecret war directive against the Soviet Union signed by Hitler. Before Tupikov, Maxim Purkayev (“Marble”), a village-born (1894) ethnic Mordvin on his first assignment abroad, had been in over his head, a circumstance Hitler himself had noticed at their initial meeting (Sept. 1939). On Feb. 14, 1940, German military counterintelligence had made an effort to compromise Purkayev to get him to work for them. He was replaced in Berlin by his deputy for aviation, Skornyakov, until Tupikov’s arrival. Lota, “Alta protiv “Barbarossy,” 210–25; Na prieme, 292–3.
33. Sipols, Tainy, 395.
34. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 1–9; Erickson, “Threat Identification,” 375–423. The immediate pre-Pact war plan, drawn up by Shaposhnikov in March 1938 and approved in Nov. of that year, had assumed a combined German-Polish assault, with Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow as the main axis, although a variant assumed a less likely thrust farther south, toward Kiev. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 557–71; Zakharov, General ‘nyi Shtab, 1.
