60. Domarus, Hitler: Reden, II: 1663; Förster and Mawdsley, “Hitler and Stalin in Perspective,” 65n8a: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, N 664/2 (Captain Karl Wilhelm Thilo diary).
61. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 169 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 1, d. 3, l. 14). See also Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 112–3.
62. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 181.
63. An excerpted summary report of NKGB foreign intelligence for 1939 through April 1941 appears in Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 130–2 (TsA FSK).
64. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 278 (f. 3, op. 7, d. 1732, l. 156). The Soviets had the Italian cipher codes since 1936. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 276.
65. Murphy, What Stalin Knew, 102 (no citation); Naylor, Man and an Institution; Cairncross, Enigma Spy, 85–93. On Stalin’s knowledge of the German inability to mount “Sea Lion,” see Vishlev, Nakanune, 37 (citing Spravka KGB SSSR, 219); and Chuev, Sto sorok, 32.
66. West and Tsarev, Crown Jewels, 214. As Andrew observes, their recruiter, Arnold Deutsch, offered a siren call of liberation that had both sexual and political appeal: “Burgess and Blunt were gay and Maclean bisexual at a time when homosexual relations, even between consenting adults, were illegal. Cairncross, like Philby a committed heterosexual, later wrote a history of polygamy.” Andrew, Defence of the Realm, 35. See also Knightley, Master Spy, 35. In 1940, Krivitsky, the Soviet defector, was invited in by Jane Archer of MI5 and claimed there were sixty-one Soviet agents in Britain, and gave descriptions that fitted Philby and Maclean, but his revelations were not followed up. Blunt gave Gorsky a secret copy of Krivitsky’s debriefing in Jan. 1941. Krivitsky died in mysterious circumstances in a Washington, D.C., hotel on Feb. 9, 1941. Kern, Death in Washington, 264–5; Costello, Mask of Treachery, 351; West and Tsarev, Crown Jewels, 145 (quoting KGB archives, without citation). John King, the cipher clerk in the foreign office, had been exposed as a Soviet spy in fall 1939.
67. Borovik, Philby Files, 167 (quoting KGB archives, without citation). German disinformation (about not attacking the USSR until after Britain’s fall) appears to have started early. Pavlov, “Sovetskaia voennaia razvedka,” 54 (no citation), Jan. 16, 1941.
68. Voskresenskaia, Pod psevdonimom Irina, 48–9.
69. Korotkov was evidently recommended to move up from the maintenance department by Venyamin Gerson, Yagoda’s personal secretary, who had met him in the exercise room at the Dynamo sports club. In 1939 Korotkov was discharged for ties to Gerson, among others, but he fought back and got reinstated. For a time he was returned to Moscow over fears that his cover had been blown. He handled Lehman as well as Schulze-Boysen and Harnack. Petrov and Skorkin, Kto rukovodil NKVD, 491; Pavlov, Tragediia sovetskoi razvedki, 364; Gladkov, Korotkov. Korotkov might have been involved in assassinations abroad. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 48. The NKVD foreign department had 81 people; in 1940, 225. But central Soviet intelligence lost most of its Latvians, Poles, Jews, and other nationalities, who were replaced in almost every instance by Russians and Russified Ukrainians, with the usual notation “from the peasantry,” “from workers,” but often without foreign languages. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 24; Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 156–7.
70. “If Zakhar [Kobulov] is ever mentioned Sudoplatov and Zhuravlyov simply wave their hands,” read a note in Kobulov’s personnel file. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, 441n30 (TsA SVR, delo “Zakhar,” no. 15952, t. 1., l 41); Izvestiia, May 5, 1990.
71. Pavlov, Tragediia Sovetskoi razvedki, 353.
72. Höhne, Kennwort; Primakov, Ocherki, III: 414–32; Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, 77–80. Another member of the Soviet spy circle was Martha Dodd, daughter of the U.S. ambassador in Berlin.
73. Lehmann, head of Gestapo counterintelligence for Soviet espionage, was said to have transmitted to his Soviet handler the contents of a report by Himmler (June 10, 1941) that revealed that the Germans did not know the depth and breadth of Soviet spying. This report has not been published. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 340. Hitler supposedly intuited that Soviet intelligence services were “much more thorough and probably much more successful” than those of other states, such as the British. Walter Schellenberg, Labyrinth, 321.
74. The British also noted that Russian speakers were being recruited into the German army and Russian émigrés into German intelligence units. Hinsley, “British Intelligence and Barbarossa,” 52.
