88. The document is only excerpted, and in the form presented shows Soviet military intelligence in a very good light. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 683 (TsAMO, op. 7279, d. 4, l. 30–1); Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 536–7. Stöbe (“Alta”) handed “Aryan” 30,000 German marks. She evidently disliked the aristocratic “Aryan,” because of his laments over his still unrealized grandiose diplomatic career and his thirst for money (she lived exceedingly frugally). “Aryan” informed “Alta” that he would also supply information to the British and the French. Around this time, she became ill and requested re-posting to a German spa town to undergo treatment; her request was denied (she was too valuable in Berlin). But as of Jan. 1941, she had lost her plum job in the German foreign ministry (press bureau), though she kept her six agents there. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 277–9, 305 (no citation).
89. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 704 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 4, l. 160–1).
90. Welkisch had joined the German Communist party in 1930, worked at the Breslauer Zeitung from 1934, and been recruited into Soviet military intelligence by Herrnstadt in Warsaw. He married Margarita Welkisch, a photographer, in 1937; she had already been recruited into Soviet military intelligence by Herrnstadt.
91. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 706–8 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 1, l. 296–303). The Geneva Convention legally allowed military attachés to gather information about the armed forces of the country in which they were accredited. Many other Soviet military attachés also served as military intelligence representatives, such as Major General Ivan Susloparov (“Maro”) in Paris, Nikolai Nikitushev (“Akasto”) in Stockholm, and I. A. Sklyarov (“Brion”) in London. Their reports are omitted here.
92. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/i: viii. “Annihilating his own intelligence apparatus, Stalin cut down a bough, on which he sat, and became a victim of the disinformation of German intelligence,” Golikov’s deputy later wrote. Novobranets, “Nakanune voiny,” 171.
93. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 70–2; Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht, 164;
94. Between Feb. and June 1941, the Soviets fed disinformation to Ivar Lissner, a Baltic German journalist, in Harbin, Manchuria, which purported to be from Russian consulates and embassies, and were designed to impress upon the Germans the costs of deeper involvement in the Balkans. Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 52–60.
95. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 44–5 (TsA FSK); Primakov, Ocherki, III: 472 (TsA FSB).
96. Golikov requested clarification from “Sophocles.” Gavrilov, Voennana razvedka informiruet, 548 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 4, l. 199); “Nakanune voiny (1940–1941 gg.),” at 219. On March 9, “Corsican,” who had seen the German air reconnaissance photos of the USSR, including of Kronstadt, conveyed that he had been told the “military attack on the USSR is an already decided issue.” Bondarenko, Fitin, 195–6 (citing FSB archives). On March 11, “Ramsay” reported out of Tokyo that Germany was still urging Japan to attack British Singapore. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 563–4 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 195–6); Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 113 (March 10, 1941), 114–5 (March 15).
97. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 564–5 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 1, l. 394–5). On March 26, 1941, “Yeshenko” reported that “a German attack against Ukraine will occur in two to three months.” Lota, Sekretnyi front, 40.
98. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 770.
99. Halder, Halder Diaries, II: 91 (April 30, 1941); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 386–8. On April 2, 1941, Hitler informed Rosenberg of the coming invasion, without specifying the date; Rosenberg immediately formed an office that would become the Ministry for the East.
100. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 303 (no citation); Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 577 (no archival citation). At the end of March 1941, Germany had about forty divisions on the frontier. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 515.
101. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1304, l. 150–1.
102. Mikoian, Tak bylo, 346. Evidently, complaints against Molotov were reaching Stalin, many a result of Beria intrigues.
103. Friedlander, Prelude, 199.