104. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 607–40, 641–50. See also Zakharov, General’nyi shtab, 226–30. The Red Army had been expanded by creating new divisions, which, by design, were partially manned, rather than by filling out the many existing partially manned divisions. After the onset of a war, all divisions were to be brought to full strength by summoning 5,000 or so reservists for each. But this approach, which had failed under the tsars, did not foresee the constraints that would prevent reservists from reaching their assigned units in time, did not foster unit cohesion in the meantime, and increased the number of required experienced officers, who were in insufficient supply. Reese, Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers, 36–9.
105. Mawdsley, “Crossing the Rubicon,” 822–3, 831, 863. This was the southern variant of the approved fall 1940 war plan.
106. V. N. Kiselev, “Upriamye fakty nachala voiny,” 18–22; Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 50–2 (excerpted); Gor’kov, “Gotovil li,” 35; Gor’kov, Kreml’, 61. The plan has not been published in full. See also Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni (6th ed.), Politizdat, 112. See also Gareev, Neodnoznachnye stranitsy, 93, 99.
107. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 731–2 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 273, l. 27–8: March 8, 1941); “Nakanune voiny (1941 g.),” 198: April 26, 1941); Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 307; Gor’kov and Semin, “O kharaktere voenno-operativnykh planov,” 109; Na prieme, 328.
108. MP-41 specified two kinds of mobilization, regular or open and “hidden” under the guise of training. “Mobilization is war, and we cannot understand it in any other way,” Shaposhnikov had written in the 1920s. Shaposhnikov, Vospominaniia, 558. “There were reasons enough to try to delay the USSR’s entry into the war, and Stalin’s tough line not to permit what Germany might be able to use as a pretext for unleashing war was justified by the historic interests of the socialist motherland,” Vasilevsky would state. “His guilt consists in not seeing, in not catching, the limit beyond which such a policy became not only unnecessary but also dangerous.” Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/ii: 242.
109. Lota, Sekretnyi front, 129.
110. Jervis, “Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy,” 165–81.
111. Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/i: 125–48. This would be Khrushchev’s self-defense in the secret speech.
112. TsAMO, f. 23, op. 7272, d. 1, l. 693–793 (March 15, 1941); Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 591–6 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 7277, d. 1, l. 140–52); Lota, “Alta protiv “Barbarossy,” 285–93. According to a top defector’s memoir, Tupikov came to the conclusion that about 180 German divisions were being concentrated on the frontier, but Dekanozov dismissed “it airily as a figment of someone’s imagination.” Akhmedov, In and Out of Stalin’s GRU, 145. In fact, Dekanozov reported to Moscow (March 16), 1941: “every day trains are heading east with weaponry (equipment, shells, vehicles and construction materials).” “Kanun voiny: preduprezhdeniia diplomatov,” 71.
113. Golikov noted that the main German thrust would supposedly not be for Moscow but Kiev and the riches of Ukraine. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 776–80 (TsAMO, op. 14750, d. 1, l. 12–21); Pavlov, “Sovetskaia voennaia razvedka,” 56; Sipols, Tainy, 395.
