153. Japan and the USSR had signed a protocol again extending the 1928 fisheries agreement on Jan. 20, 1941, through year’s end, after Japan had made concessions. Izvestiia, Jan. 21, 1941; Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR IV: 539–42.
154. Matsuoka, according to information Sorge gleaned from German ambassador Ott, sent a telegram to U.S. secretary of state Hull inquiring about improved bilateral relations. He hoped the United States could be persuaded to cease its support for Chiang Kai-shek, and not be drawn into trade to assist Nazi Germany. The same Soviet intelligence report observed that the new German military attaché in Tokyo “is extremely pessimistic and expects open Japanese treachery, and asked to be released from his post.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 425 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 5840, d. 7, l. 87). On April 22, 1941, Soviet military intelligence reported to Moscow that the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army (Takahashi) told a group of journalists that “the USSR, acknowledging the might of Japan, concluded a neutrality pact in order to concentrate its forces in the West.” He added that “now Japan’s fundamental task is to conclude the Chinese war.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 423 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 321: April 26, 1941).
155. The diminutive Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, the former head of Japanese military intelligence for the USSR, waved his handkerchief and was heard to say in Russian, “Spasibo, Spasibo (Thank you, thank you).” DGFP, series D, XII: 537; Teske, General Ernst Köstring, 300–1; Sipols, Tainy, 389; Scott, Duel for Europe, 234–7 (an eyewitness); Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 190; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 198. See also Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia, 350–1.
156. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 31–2 (TsA FSB, f. 3o, op. 8, d. 56, l. 789–91). The full report from Kobulov also stated, based on another source, that Matsuoka had signed the Neutrality Pact on German orders, to win the later time. He concluded that this showed that “not only was Germany intending a march against the USSR, but also is taking all necessary diplomatic measures for it.” Naumov, 1941 god, 82–4 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 236–301: April 16).
157. “Yeshenko” wrote of Welkisch: “‘ABC’ reports: ‘people are speaking openly and without the least doubt about the pending German military actions against the USSR, Antonescu’s meetings more and more concretely concern military preparations against the USSR.’” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 586–7 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 1, l. 606–9).
158. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1305, l. 79; Pravda followed the activities on its front page (April 19 and 21).
159. Nevezhin, Zastol’nye, 259–61 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1125, l. 17–18); Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 155–7. Pravda (April 23) published a short notice about the Kremlin reception and a long essay (April 24), “One Thousand Years of Tajik Literature,” by Iosif Braginsky, the Persian language specialist, stressing that the Tajiks were an Iranian people and culture.
160. Izvestiia, March 15, 1941; Vestnik AN SSSR, no. 4 (1941): 15–6; “Prazdnik sotsialisticheskoi kul’tury,” Iskusstvo, 1941, no. 6: 3–10.
161. Nevezhin, Zastol’nye, 266–70 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1124, l. 15–20). The following day (April 23), in the Little Corner, at 7:10 p.m. for fifty minutes, Stalin received the Tajik party boss (Dmitri Protopopov) and government head (M. Kurbanov), as well as Khrapchenko, the head of USSR committee for artistic affairs, evidently to finalize the state wards for the artists. Kalinin, handing out the state awards to the Tajik participants in the Kremlin, quoted Stalin on Tajik culture: “ancient, with a grand reserve among the people, this culture is distinguished by special subtlety.” Pravda, April 26, 1941; Na prieme, 331.
