162. Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 38–9 (citing War Department, Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, report 17,875: Jan. 17, 1941, by Colonel B. R. Peyton, MID file 2016–1326/7, MID, correspondence, 1917–1941, box 634, RG 165, NA), 40–4; Laquer and Breitman, Breaking the Silence, 282n; Long, War Diary of Breckinridge Long, 182–4; Hull, Memoirs, II: 967–9; Welles, Time for Decision, 170–1; FRUS, 1941, I: 712, 714 (Hull to Steinhardt, March 4, 1941), 723; Damaskin, Stalin i razvedka, 262–3. Whaley has the timing and source a bit crossed. Whaley, Codeword, 37–40, 45, 227–8, 277–8. The U.S. commercial attaché, the Texan Sam Woods (b. 1892), mischaracterized as “a genial extrovert whose grasp of world politics and history was not striking,” fooled everyone. Shirer, Rise and Fall, 843n; Dippel, Two Against Hitler.
163. Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese Confidant, 21 (citing NSA, RG 457, SRH-252: 30); Damaskin, Stalin i razvedka, 262–3. See also Shirer, Rise and Fall, chapter 23. Ōshima had been recalled from Berlin in Sept. 1939, after the unpleasant surprise of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. When Laurence Steinhardt, U.S. ambassador, “very confidentially” told foreign affairs commissariat deputy head Lozovsky (April 15) that “according to trustworthy information received from the embassy in Berlin Germany’s position is getting worse and worse and it is preparing an attack on Ukraine,” Lozovsky said, “I do not think that Germany will attack the USSR . . . In any case the USSR will always be ready and will not allow itself to be captured by enemies.” Lozovsky reported that Steinhardt “pledged that in the event of a German attack on the USSR the USA would provide aid to the USSR.” Naumov, 1941 god, 80–1 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 3, pap. 4, d. 35, l. 173–7); “Kanun voiny: preduprezhdeniia diplomatov,” 80. Welles leaked to Umansky, whose government had him leak to the German ambassador in Washington, that the United States had broken the Japanese codes, and were deciphering Ōshima’s communications, on April 28, 1941. DGFP, series D, XII: 661 (Hans Thomsen from D.C. to Berlin). The Americans intercepted and decoded this message.
164. “Kanun voiny: preduprezhdeniia diplomatov,” 71–2.
165. The Germans were still demanding the plane’s return as of May 15. Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 330–1 (Ritter to Schulenburg); Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 342; Rokossovskii, Soldatskii dolg, 31–2; Bezymenskii, Osobaia papka “Barbarossa,” 276.
166. Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 344–5 (April 22, 1941).
167. Stalin suddenly began overfulfilling his trade obligations, even though the Germans had fallen way behind in reciprocal deliveries. May 1941 would be the peak month for two-way trade. DGFP, series D, XII: 282–3 (March 12, 1941), 826 (May 15); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 318–9 (report of Schnurre, April 5, 1941); Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 326. See also Von Strandmann, “Appeasement and Counter-Appeasement,” 164. Stalin also made gestures to Hungary, returning banners and flags from the 1848 revolution (which tsarist troops had put down), and to Romania, with which he settled one border dispute.
168. DVP SSSR, XXIII/ii: 572 (April 15, 1941), 661–3, 714. But Stalin had also jacked up the freight rates for the transhipment of goods to Germany across Soviet territory, pocketing the windfall. Sipols, Tainy, 387; Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 47 (citing Ministry of Economic Warfare, Trans-Siberian Railway: Freight Rates, April 3, 1941, FO/371/29497). See also Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 608.
169. Soviet capabilities should not be exaggerated. Its advance warning system (VNOS) did not always warn of approaching German aircraft, and Soviet interceptors could not follow them across the frontier so well, while the Red Army lacked sufficient antiaircraft artillery to shoot them out of the sky.
170. Dilks, “‘We Must Hope for the Best’”; DBFP, 3rd series, II: 686 (Chamberlain to Halifax, Aug. 19, 1938); Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, 291, 347.
171. Osokina, Za fasadom, 272–7.
172. Sipols, Tainy, 389–90. Between March 21 and April 17, a German delegation was shown the major Soviet aviation factories (Moscow, Rybinsk, Molotov). The Germans had let the Soviets see the Heinkel and Junkers aircraft production facilities in Nov.–Dec. 1940, following Molotov’s trip to Berlin.
173. Schwendemann, Die Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, 329; Sudoplatov, Razvedka i Kreml’, 135; Vishlev, Nakanune, 30–1.
