174. Too many scholars have wrongly interpreted Stalin’s behavior in spring 1941 as abject appeasement, without acknowledging the attempted deterrence. Lisann, “Stalin the Appeaser.”
175. Teske, General Ernst Köstring, 297.
176. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 131–2; Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 122, 128. See also Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 187–8.
177. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 117.
178. Below, At Hitler’s Side, 92.
179. Rittersporn, Anguish, 56 (citing RGVA, f. 501k, op. 3, d. 534, l. 7ob.–15); Buchheit, Der deutsche Geheimdienst, 253; Plotnikova, “Organy,” 31. The existence of a major Luftwaffe air reconnaissance program had been confirmed out of Berlin by “Elder” as early as Dec. 1940. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 550 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 199–201), I: 769–70 (TsA SVR), II: 89–91 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 269–74), II: 179–80 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 1, l. 762–3). Stalin was also sending reconnaissance flights over German lines, with German knowledge. Whaley, Codeword, 32; DGFP, series D, XII: 602–3, 1061–3; Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, appendix 3; Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 329.
180. Halder, Halder Diaries, II: 104 (May 7, 1941); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 400–2.
181. Sorge noted: “in Himmler’s circles and the general staff there is a strong tendency for launching a war against the USSR, but this tendency is not yet predominant.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 585–6 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 300). On April 29, Kegel (“X”), deputy head of the economics section of the German embassy in Moscow, correctly reported that Germany intended to have transferred all the necessary synthetic rubber from Asia by May 15. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 710; Lota, Sekretnyi front, 230–4. In April 1941, Korotkov, having returned from Moscow, discussed with Kobulov setting up ciphered radio communications for “Elder” and “Corsican” in the event of war; the effort got bogged down. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, 394–6.
182. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 100 (TsAMO, op. 24122/1, l. 178), 105–4 (APRF, f. 93: April 23, 1941), 506; Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 330, 362–3; Gareev, Neodnoznachnye stranitsy, 115.
183. Ehrenburg, Liudi, gody, zhizn’, II: 228.
184. Baranov, Goluboi razliv, 86–7.
185. In fact, from April 1941, the German deployments shifted to a qualitatively new level. Van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy, 150. Tupikov added: “If it happens that, in laying out these conclusions, I am pushing at an open door, this will in no way discourage me. If it happens that I am mistaken, you will correct me—and I shall be grateful.” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 113–8 (TsAMO, op. 7272, d. 1, l. 140–52); Lota, Sekretnyi front, 44, 189–97. Only on June 3, 1941, did Golikov instruct his subordinate Kuznetsov that it was necessary to answer Tupikov.
186. Schulenburg and his embassy secretary were back at the Hotel Adlon in less than an hour. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 330–2. It seems that Hans “Johnnie” Herwath, the anti-Nazi who had divulged the Pact’s secret protocols to the American ambassador in Moscow, had quit Germany’s Moscow embassy to join the Wehrmacht and through contacts had evidently gotten wind of the firm decision for an attack on the USSR. During a military leave in Berlin, he claims to have used the pretext of visiting his wife, Pussi, who was still working in Moscow, to travel back and inform ambassador Schulenburg that plans for an attack on the USSR were well under way. Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 182–4, 191; Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 328; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 203–17; Hinsley, British Intelligence, Abridged Version, 27–8. Stalin would get word of Schulenburg’s cold reception by the Führer from (Kegel) “X,” who pointed out that in 1939 Hitler had similarly lied to his ambassador to Poland, Hans-Adolf von Moltke.
187. Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 349 (Bernard Bracken). In March 1941, Moscow had ordered a secret police operative, Kyrill Novikov, to accompany Maisky to all official meetings. A telegram from Eden to Cripps (April 18, 1941) obtained by Soviet intelligence in London, inquired whether rapprochement with Moscow was still possible, but Soviet annexation of the Baltic states remained a stumbling block. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 474–5 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 8, d. 56, l. 903–6).
