222. This was forwarded by Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov, and Beria on May 14, and included additional detail about Romania’s preparations for war. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 180–1 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 388–90); Primakov, Ocherki, III: 480–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1277–80). See also Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, 89 (citing FSB archives).
223. Hilger speculated that Hitler perceived Soviet weakness, fear. Hilger and Mayer, Incompatible Allies, 327.
224. Naumov, 1941 god, II; 181–4 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 162–8). See also Sipols, Tainy, 403.
225. Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 243–4 (no citation); Khlevniuk, Stalin: Zhizn’, 251–2 (citing GARF, vospominaniia Ia. E. Chadaeva). On May 8, Stalin received Khrushchev, alone, for thirty minutes; nearly four hours later, he received Beria, alone, for five minutes. Those were the only people he saw that day. Na prieme, 333. As of May 10, Molotov was back in the customary position, entering the Little Corner before any other visitors. Na prieme, 333.
226. Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, VII: 3374, 2380, 2394.
227. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 305.
228. Whether it was noticed in Moscow remains uncertain.
229. DVP SSSR, XXIII/ii: 654–7, 664–7, 675–9; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 193 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 174: Molotov instructions to Dekanozov, May 12), II: 193–5 (l. 169–73: Dekanozov notes); DGFP, series D, XII: 734–5 (May 7, 1941); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 218–21 (citing APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 169–73: Dekanozov notes on May 12 breakfast); Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 351. There is nonsense, from Mikoyan and Kumanev, that Schulenburg had warned Dekanozov, in the presence of Hilger and Pavlov, of the forthcoming invasion. Kumanev, “‘22ogo’ na rassvete,” 3. “He didn’t warn,” Molotov stated of Schulenburg, “he just hinted at it.” Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 29.
230. Na prieme, 332–3.
231. Hess’s flight likely was unassisted by German electronic systems. Deighton, “Hess the Aviator,” 121–38. One of the Luftwaffe’s best pilots would claim, after the war, that on May 10, 1941, Göring had called and ordered him to intercept Hess, who was already in the air. Adolph Galland, the pilot, would also claim that he implemented the order only perfunctorily, having no idea how to find Hess’s Messcherschmitt Bf 110 amid all the others in the sky at that time. Tolliver and Constable, Fighter General.
232. Fox, “Propaganda,” 88 (citing FO 1093/10: Medical Research Council report); Rees et al., Case of Rudolf Hess, 16; Pick, Pursuit of the Nazi Mind, 42. See also Hess, Prisoner of Peace, 31–8.
233. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 246–9 (citing WO 199/3288/A: May 11, 1941, and FO 1093/11 fols. 152–5).
234. Heiden, “Hitler’s Better Half.”
235. Schellenberg, Schellenberg Memoirs, 201. Churchill would later assert that Hess denied Germany was planning an invasion and asserted that Germany had certain demands the USSR would have to satisfy—i.e., the ultimatum. Churchill, Second World War, II: 46.
236. Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 103 (May 11, 1941); Schmidt, Statist, 549; Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 372, citing Heinz Linge, “Kronzuege Linge: der kammerdiener des ‘Führers,’” Revue, Munich, Nov. 1955–March 1956, 60; Halder, Halder Diaries, II: 117–8 (May 15, 1941); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 412–5. Hess left four letters: the others were for his wife, Ilse, Willy Messerschmitt (whose plane he took), and Helmut Kaden (whose flight suit he took).
237. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 372–3.
238. Fest, Face, 292; Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 375–6.
239. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 372. When Hitler summoned Mussolini on June 2, 1941, to the Brenner Pass they talked, among other matters, about Hess. The Führer was said to have had tears in his eyes. Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 174.
240. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 309–10 (May 13, 1941). See also Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 274. The next day the Germans issued a fuller statement, calling Hess’s mission a result of “mental confusion” that would change nothing in German-British relations. Goebbels had objected, to no avail (“It’s rightly being asked how such an idiot could be the second man after the Führer”). Domarus, Hitler: Reden, IV: 1716; Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 311 (May 14). See also Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, IV: 532 (Leipzig SD report, May 17, 1941).
