241. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 375; Gamm, Der Flüsterwitz, 36; Vassiltchikov, Berlin Diaries, 51 (May 18, 1941).
242. The British interrogator (Ivone Kirkpatrick) concluded: “Hess does not seem . . . to be in the near counsels of the German government as regards operations; and he is not likely to possess more secret information that he could glean in the course of his conversations with Hitler and others.” See also Schmidt, “Der Hess-Flug,” 14. Goebbels (May 15) intuited that the British had chosen to “let the lies run free” and became gleeful that the British had failed to play this trump card properly, and said the German people were comparing the incident to “a razor cut on the face” that would heal quickly and be forgotten. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 317–9 (May 17, 1941); Boelcke, Secret Conferences, 165 (May 19).
243. Tsarev, “Poslednii polet,” III: 433–40. On May 18, Philby, after a conversation with a foreign office press department contact, reported that Hess had not given away any valuable information, remained loyal to Hitler, and called the German-British war a crime. Tsarev, “Poslednii polet,” III: 435–7; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 200–1 (May 14, 1941).
244. Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 272; Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 116. The Soviets also believed the British secret services had been involved in luring Hess. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, 157; and Erickson, “Rudolf Hess.” Roosevelt doubted the official British story as well, and feared there was substance to the rumors of a substantive peace mission. Kimball, “Hess Distraction”; Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, I: 184–6; Pick, Pursuit of the Nazi Mind, 45 (citing PPF3716, letters from John Coar and Ambassador William Dodd). Dekanozov sent Molotov a comprehensive analysis (May 21, 1941) of the Hess mission, based on the German press and hearsay in Berlin, asserting that it proved the existence of divisions within the German leadership and a tendency toward an agreement with Britain. It was forwarded to Stalin on May 26. Nauomv, 1941 god, II: 261–6 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 689, l. 64–74).
245. Cripps, in some desperation back on April 23, 1941, had telegrammed London about Soviet-German negotiations (which did not exist), speculating that Hitler could get what he wanted from Moscow by blackmail without war, and that the Soviets feared a separate deal between Britain and Germany, which could be used by London to prevent a Soviet-German deal. He stressed that only the fear of a separate peace would bring the Soviets around to the British side. This had been intercepted and decrypted, and forwarded by Fitin on May 5 to Stalin, Molotov, and Beria. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 152–3 (TsA FSB, f. Zos, op. 8, d. 56, l. 1160–3). Cadogan noted in his diary (May 30, 1941), effectively repudiating Cripps, that because of British military weakness, its diplomacy was “completely hamstrung. For instance—Russia. You can’t do anything nowadays with any country unless you can a) threaten b) bribe it. Russia has a) no fear of us whatever and b) we have nothing to offer her.” Dilks, Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 382.
246. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I: 614–5; Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow, 134–5.
247. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 262–7 (citing AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 352, d. 2402, l. 174, and The Times, May 27, 1941). See also Görtemaker, “Bizarre Mission,” 75–101; Kettenacker, “Mishandling a Spectacular Event,” 19–38; and Fox, “Propaganda.” On June 5, Maisky insisted to Eden that no German-Soviet negotiations were under way; Eden replied that he knew they were. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 273 (citing AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 352, d. 2402, l. 149–52: Maisky to Moscow); Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 359. Woodward gives the date of this encounter as June 10: British Foreign Policy, I: 620.
