253. The proposed surprise attack of 152 divisions and 3,000–4,000 aircraft against German positions in former southern Poland carried timetables and maps of the theater (one map carried a date, the lone one on the document). Gor’kov, “Gotovil li,” 40–5; Gor’kov, Kreml’, 303–9; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 215–20 (TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, d. 237, l. 1–15); Bobylev, “Tochku v diskussii stavit’ rano”; Zakharov, General’nyi shtab, 219–21. A partial, misleading version of the Vasilevsky plan was published: Kiselev, “Upriamye fakty nachala voiny,” 18–22. There has also been misleading commentary: Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/i: 136. For an analysis, see Bezymenskii, “O ‘Plane Zhukova.’” Bezymensky was Zhukov’s interpreter during the war. He reproduced a facsimile of some pages of the May 15 war plan (showing the quality penmanship). Bezymenskii, Gitler i Stalin, 478–9. The April 1941 local version of the war plan stated: “The USSR does not contemplate attacking Germany and Italy. These states are probably also not contemplating attacking the USSR in the near future.” Solonin, “Tri plana tovarischa Stalina,” 45–49.
254. Anfilov, “‘Razgovor zakonchilsia ugrozoi Stalina,’” 40–1; Forster and Mawdsley, “Hitler and Stalin in Perspective,” 86. There is a third-hand account of a blow-up between Stalin and Zhukov and Timoshenko. Bezymenskii, “O ‘Plane Zhukova,’” 61–2, 62n27 (citing General Nikolai Liashchenko, a major in 1941, who recorded conversations with Timoshenko in the 1960s); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 299 (citing the same source). A less dramatic version appears in Svetlishin, Krutye stupeni, 57–8 (interviews with Zhukov).
255. Anfilov, “‘Razgovor zakonchilsia ugrozoi Stalina’,” 41. Stalin also met with Timoshenko and Zhukov, but not Vatutin, on May 23, for two hours and fifty-five minutes. Na prieme, 333–4.
256. Molotov cautioned in connection to those such as Vasilevsky who claimed to know Stalin’s thinking: “‘Stalin believed this, Stalin thought that.’ As if anyone knew what Stalin thought about the war.” Chuev, Sto sorok, 42, 45.
257. Anfilov, “‘Razgovor zakonchilsia ugrozoi Stalina’,” 41; Anfilov, Doroga k tragedii, 166; Svetlishin, Krutye stupeni, 57–8. The document’s authenticity is beyond question, but in addition to the lack of signatures, there are no markings by Stalin on it. The document was apparently locked in the personal safe of Vasilevsky until 1948, and not kept in Stalin’s archive or Zhukov’s. From Vasilevsky’s safe it went to the military archives (TsAMO RF, f. 16a, op. 2951, d. 237). Danilov, “Stalinskaia strategiia nachala voiny.”
258. Gor’kov, “Gotovil li,” 40–1. A May 15 special communication by Golikov on the dislocation of German forces estimated 114–19 divisions in the frontier zone, and concluded: “The strengthening of German forces on the border with the USSR continues. The main territories of concentration are the southern part of the General-Gouvernement, Slovakia, and the northern part of Moldavia.” Lota, Sektretnyi front, 205–9 (citing TsAMO, op. 7237, d. 2, l. 109–13); Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 518. Vasilevsky would later show hindsight appreciation of German force concentrations, which had not been reflected in the May 15 war plan text. Kumanev, Riadom so Stalinym, 232–3. See also Anfilov and Golikov, Zagadka 1941 goda, 251; Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 310.
259. A special inspection (May 23–June 5, 1941) of western military districts found their combat readiness unsatisfactory. Volkogonov, “German Attack,” 80.
260. Gareev, Neodnoznachnye stranitsy, 96. Only at the end of May 1941 had the general staff organized a war game to test the viability of covering plans under conditions of surprise attack. Nothing is known of the game’s results. Denisova and Tumash, Nakanune, 391. See also Murin, “Nakanune,” 9 (Arkhiv politbiuro TsK KPSS, f. 73, op. 2, d. 3, l. 30–44).
261. Mawdsley, “Crossing the Rubicon,” 836–44. Mawdsley, whose analysis is the best in print, notes that the late amendations by Vatutin were defensive, not preemptive, suggesting confusion or compromise even in the drafting, although these changes might have been written in Stalin’s presence. The assertion that Hitler’s invasion preempted an imminent Soviet attack, a baldfaced German lie circulated to justify their invasion, was shredded by Gabriel Gorodetsky, Mif “Ledokola.”
