Hitler stood at a new zenith of power in July 1940. And yet, despite all his conquests and Britain’s manifest inability to dislodge him from the continent, the British government vowed to keep on fighting. He had repaired to his alpine retreat, to confer with his military on the feasibility of a cross-Channel invasion. Germany would need control of the Channel by sea and air, which was not remotely in prospect.126 Under Chamberlain, the British had built several ships and radar stations and greatly expanded production capacity for fighter airplanes without actually making many of them, thereby controlling peacetime expenses and limiting stockpiles of obsolete weapons. In 1940, when fighting broke out, Britain quickly managed to outproduce Germany in single-engine fighters, which contributed significantly to the British ability to beat back the Luftwaffe air assault. The British Home Fleet alone—only a part of the Royal Navy—possessed 5 battleships, 11 cruisers, and 30 destroyers.127 The Norwegian campaign had weakened the German navy, which at this point was down to one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, and four destroyers. Grand Admiral Raeder, the German naval commander in chief, and others harbored grave doubts about landing on the British Isles without a huge prior buildup. All seemed to depend on the Luftwaffe.128
Churchill, under German bombardment, dreamed of escape. “If Hitler fails to beat us here he will probably recoil eastwards,” he had written to the prime minister of the Union of South Africa (June 27, 1940). “Indeed, he may do this even without trying invasion [of the UK], to find employment for his Army, and take the edge off the winter strain upon him.”129
Hitler understood the transcendent value that Britain attached to its global empire and, in his own way, was sincere in his offers to allow that empire to remain intact, certainly in the medium term, in exchange for a free hand on the continent, where raw materials and racial
At a “Führer conference” with only the highest military men, on July 21, 1940, Hitler stated that “even though Moscow is unenthusiastic about Germany’s great success, she will nevertheless make no effort to enter the war against Germany of her own accord.” Rumors—duly conveyed to Stalin—were rife that Germany was getting ready to attack the USSR even before France had fallen.134 The Wehrmacht was transferring back eastern units that had been called to France and Belgium, and Soviet military intelligence was reporting German troop concentrations on the eastern frontier (railroads were under covert surveillance).135 German officers were said to be studying Russian language at courses given in occupied Prague. Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians living in Poland had been organized. Everyone was talking, everywhere: troop exercises, planned diplomatic evacuations, imminent war. Was it real? Disinformation? German fortifications in the east were being greatly expanded; then again, the German state had expanded, so this was to be expected. Germany’s military attaché in Moscow, Köstring, told his Soviet interlocutors (July 9) that German forces were being “demobilized” from the west and stationed in East Prussia and former Poland, where new garrisons were being formed, “since retaining many troops in the West is no longer necessary.”136
The “parking” of German troops in the east was accelerating, but bombing raids by the Luftwaffe over Britain continued, as Soviet intelligence also reported.137 Could Hitler really intend to
