Germany endeavored to goad Japan into attacking Singapore, so as to provoke Britain into war in the Far East and perhaps also drag the United States in (and away from European affairs), but Tokyo’s ability to commit remained stymied by interest group infighting.140 At the same time, Major General Alfred Jodl, chief of the operations staff, had raised the possibility of bringing Britain to its knees indirectly, by hitting vulnerable spots in the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East, reasoning that as the screws were tightened on Britain’s global position, it would surrender, to stem its losses. The Italians, he thought, could occupy the Suez Canal. Spain or another country could grab Gibraltar. The oil terminus in Haifa could just be blown up.141 This had sparked the notion of a broad anti-British front of Italy, Spain, and maybe the Soviet Union, even as Hitler was contemplating smashing the latter to bits, as a way to get Britain to capitulate. “Crossing of Channel appears very hazardous to the Führer,” army chief of staff Halder recorded in his diary (July 22). “Invasion is to be undertaken only if no other way is left to bring terms with England.”142 That same day, Halifax broadcast a definitive British rejection of the German terms for “peace.” On July 23, Hitler went on his annual pilgrimage to Bayreuth for the Wagner Festival, taking in
Jodl and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, de facto war minister, managed to convince Hitler that a fall 1940 date for an invasion of the USSR was “hopelessly impractical” (according to a memo written by the former and signed by the latter).144 On July 29, at another Führer conference at the Berghof, Hitler shifted a Soviet invasion target date out to May 1941, which was both the earliest feasible date and the latest date from the point of view of safe concentration of forces in the east.145 Jodl informed only a tiny group of war planners, headed by Walter Warlimont, in the strictest secrecy, for Halder and other top Wehrmacht generals saw no basis for a war against the Soviet Union, and plenty of opportunity for rapprochement with Stalin.146
On July 31, Hitler convened yet another narrow-circle Führer conference at the Berghof.147 Raeder and Halder reported. Those present argued that a cross-Channel invasion of Britain could not be carried out until September 1940 (if then). Hitler signed Directive No. 17, on stepping up the air war (which would be called the Battle of Britain) “to prepare the ground for the final crushing of England.”148 He rejected Raeder’s postponement of the Channel invasion, Operation Sea Lion, until spring 1941, but postponement is effectively what happened, for Hitler stated that if the results of the air attacks on Britain proved unfavorable, Sea Lion preparations would be stopped.149 As for the Wehrmacht, despite a plan to reduce its size to lessen the strain on the economy, Hitler ordered a ramp-up from 120 to 180 divisions (a number that would grow) and the launching of a massive logistics program in the east.150 Göring, when told, would be thrilled.151 This represented a policy victory for both the peripheral strategy against Britain and the full-scale invasion of the USSR. “Our action must be directed to eliminate all factors that let England hope for a change in the situation,” Hitler told the attendees. “Russia is the factor on which Britain is relying the most. . . . With Russia smashed, Britain’s last hope will be shattered.”152
Hitler had effectively conceded that he lacked the resources to defeat the world’s leading navy and air force, but he felt he could summon the resources to defeat world’s largest land army. This was, in a way, logical, reflecting his own force structure. But several top Wehrmacht officers viewed an unprovoked invasion of the east before securing victory in the west as unsound.
It was, in any case, passing strange. For decades, the Führer had been hammering the necessity of annihilating Bolshevism and following the siren call of
MISPLACED JOY
